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PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR JURISPRUDENCE
JUJL A, B. MCDONNELL t
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CODE LABORATORY
Contemporary jurisprudence is absorbed in a protracted debate
concerning the dimensions of judicial discretion. Is a judge in
certain difficult or "hard cases" free to legislate a solution by choos-
ing among competing alternatives, any one of which might be
acceptable, or must he always reach the one right result by uncover-
ing and weighing the pre-existing entitlements of the disputants
before him? Professor H. L. A. Hart, the established sage, leads the
positivist camp in contending that judges may appropriately legis-
late in hard cases in which the applicability of legal rules is un-
certain.' Professor Ronald Dworkin, the provocative challenger,
urges instead a "rights thesis" under which judicial decisions, even
in hard cases, "characteristically are and should be generated by
principle not policy." 2
In the course of this debate considerable attention has focused
on the problems of legislative interpretation. Professor Hart has
illustrated his position with reference to an ordinance prohibiting
f Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia. B.S. 1963, Spring Hill
College; LL.B. 1966, University of Virginia. The author expresses his appreciation
to Professors Ronald Ellington, Eric Holmes, and Ellen Jordan for their criticisms
of an earlier draft of this Article.
1 H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 200 (1961). A recent statement of Pro-
fessor Hart's views is contained in Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English
Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REv. 969 (1977).
2 Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1060 (1975), reprinted in
R. DwoRKN, TAx=nG REIEs SmousLY 81, 84 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hard
Cases]. A recent statement of Professor Dworkidn's position appears in Dxvorkin,
Seven Critics, 11 GA. L. RBv. 1201 (1977). Dworkin defines the terms "principle"
and "policy" in a special way. A policy argument justifies a decision because it
advances or protects "some collective goal of the community as a whole." Hard
Cases, supra, at 109. An argument of principle justifies a decision "by showing
that the decision respects or secures some individual or group right." Id. Policy
is bound up in utility, principle in fairness. In Dworkin's view a legislative program
may be justified by both types of argument. Id. Legislative interpretation remains
an argument about principle, however, because it is used to determine "what rights
the legislature has already created." Id. 1088 n.23. In this Article, as in the
Uniform Commercial Code and its commentary, no attempt is made to utilize
Ihvorkha's definitions. The terms "purpose" and "policy" are both used here in
referring to the articulated social or legal objectives of legislation, whether those
objectives involve the madmization of individual fairness or the advancement of
general social utility. Many Code provisions can be defended on both grounds.
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vehicles in a public park. The general word "vehicle," he argued,
must have "some standard instance in which no doubts are felt
about its application." 1 For example, "'[i]f anything is a vehicle
a motor-car is one.' "4 Without such standard cases, general terms
"would be useless to us as a medium of communication." r In addi-
tion to "a core of settled meaning," there will be "a penumbra of
debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable
nor obviously ruled out." 6 For example, would "vehicle" as used
here include bicycles, airplanes, or roller skates? 7 In applying rules
to cases within the penumbra a choice must sometimes be made on
the basis of extra-legal factors.
Likewise, Professor Dworkin has used legislative materials to
illustrate his "rights thesis," arguing that Riggs v. Palmer 8 exem-
plified it. Riggs involved the judicial interpretation of New York
legislation enacted to ensure that a testator's will controlled the
disposition of his property. The court barred a murderer from
inheriting under his victim's will, and Dworkin has quoted the
rationale of Riggs with approval: "No one shall be permitted to
profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or
to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property
by his own crime." 9 Thus, the result in Riggs was mandated by
this principle regarding individual equity.
Despite their differences, both Hart and Dworkin seem to limit
the role of the lawmakers' purpose or objective. Hart suggested
that a range of "standard" cases could be controlled by linguistic
convention alone, leaving inquiry into the purpose of the legislation
for problems of the "penumbra." 10 Yet Hart later admitted that
even the standard "easy" case might involve ambiguities that had
to be resolved in light of legislative purpose," an admission cloud-
a Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAnv. L. Rnv.
593, 607 (1958). The same example is used in H. HART, supra note 1, at 123.
4 H. HAnT, supra note 1, at 123.
5 Id.
6 Hart, supra note 3, at 607.
7 See H. HAnT, supra note 1, at 123.
8 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
OId. at 511, 22 N.E. at 190, quoted in Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35
U. Cm. L. REv. 14, 23-24 (1967).
10 Professor Lon Fuller vigorously dissented from Harts suggestion that cases
could be disposed of on the basis of linguistic convention alone. Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. Rv. 630, 661-69
(1958).
11 The clear cases are those in which there is general agreement that they
fall within the scope of a rule, and it is tempting to ascribe such agree-
ments simply to the fact that there are necessarily such agreements in the
use of the shared conventions of language. But this would be an over-
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ing the very definition of the standard case.12  Professor Dworkin
approaches legislative purpose from a different direction but with
similar results. Consideration of purpose is not, in Dworkin's
model, preconditioned on linguistic difficulties. Even when the
legislature has failed to articulate a controlling policy, the jurist is
to project one, basing his decision on that policy which most "satis-
factorily ties the language the legislature used to its constitutional
responsibilities." 13 The controlling policy, whether articulated or
projected, is limited, however, by the "canonical terms of the actual
statute." 14 The legislature, in Dworkin's view, is entitled to set
arbitrary limits on its adopted policy. It establishes these limits
through its selection of language. Arguably, it is this linguistic
constraint that preserves the rights theory. Because the language
of legislation limits interpretation, legislative interpretation reduces
to a determination of "what rights the legislature has already
created." 15
In contrast with the views of Hart and Dworkin is the theory
,of legislation shared by those primarily responsible for shaping the
Uniform Commercial Code. Professor Karl Llewellyn and his col-
leagues also fashioned themselves jurisprudes. In significant re-
spects they produced a Code structured by the orientations of the
jurisprudential movement known as American legal realism.
Central to the realist movement was a belief in the necessity
for a "purposive interpretation" "I of legal institutions. The theory
of purposive interpretation is rooted in the concept of law as a
means to selected social ends-a method of social engineering. It
simplification because it does not allow for the special conventions of the
legal use of words, which may diverge from their common use, or for the
way in which the meanings of words may be clearly controlled by reference
to the purpose of a statutory enactment which itself may be either explicitly
stated or generally agreed.
Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, in 6 THu ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PnIosopHy 264,
271 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
12 Hart admits that it is difficult to define what makes some cases "easy" and
others "hard." Id. For a discussion of the uncertain role of purpose in Harts
theory, see Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin
Dispute, 75 MicH. L. REv. 473, 484-88 (1977).
13 Hard Cases, supra note 2, at 1085-86.
14 Id. 1087.
15 Id. 1088 n.23.
16 The label "purposive interpretation" was used by Professor Fuller in his
famous exchange with Hart. Fuller, supra note 10, at 669. Writing in a natural
law tradition, Fuller employed the term to refer both to the morality required for
a well-ordered society and to concrete objectives of given legislation. In its refer-
ence to the latter category of articulated social or legal objectives, Fullers program
corresponds with that of moderate realists such as Llewellyn. As used here
"purposive interpretation" is defined in terms of this second type of purpose.
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seeks to define legal standards in terms of the purposes they are
designed to implement. It denies that either statutory provisions
or common law doctrines can be adequately understood by reference
to a standard of ordinary or plain usage. Thus, the realists never
tired of resurrecting Justice Holmes' famous declaration: "A word
is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used." 17
Of course, the realists did not invent the practice of construing
language in light of purpose. Such an approach was recognized in
Anglo-American law at least as early as Heydon's Case 's in which
statutory interpretation was said to demand inquiry into the "mis-
chief and defect for which the common law did not provide" and
the "true reason" of the remedy which Parliament had adopted "to
eure the disease of the commonwealth." 19 The realists' program
was distinguished by the programmatic and unrestrained manner in
which they sought to institutionalize this approach.
In drafting the Uniform Commercial Code they first delineated
central "underlying purposes and policies" of the project as a whole.
These are contained in section 1-102(2):
Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the
parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdic-
tions.
20
These goals were not casually derived. They reflect the fact that
the drafters thought of the Code as remedial legislation. The Code
was drawn to avoid the complexity, obsolescence, and divergent in-
terpretations which had plagued prior uniform laws in the commer-
cial field. In an effort to assure that these objectives were not
treated as a mere preamble, the drafters directed: "This Act shall
17Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
18 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584).
19 Id. 638.
20 U.C.C. § 1-102(2).
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be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying pur-
poses and policies." 21
Second, and more particularly, the drafters sought to articulate
the policy embodied in each provision of the Code. In so doing
they acted more like judges justifying a decision than legislators
declaring law by fiat.22  They defended this approach to drafting
as necessary for the attainment of the Code's underlying remedial
objectives. Thus, the Chief Reporter listed as his first principle of
drafting technique: "The principle of the patent reason: Every
provision should show its reason on its face. Every body of pro-
visions should display on their face their organizing principle." 2-
Llewellyn explained this principle in terms of the demands of
rationality and the central objectives of a uniform and adaptive
commercial law:
The rationale of this is that construction and applica-
tion are intellectually impossible except with reference to
some reason and theory of purpose and organization.
Borderline, doubtful, or uncontemplated cases are inevi-
table. Reasonably uniform interpretation by judges of
different schooling, learning and skill is tremendously fur-
thered if the reason which guides application of the same
language is the same reason in all cases. A patent reason,
moreover, tremendously decreases the leeway open to the
skilful advocate for persuasive distortion or misapplication
of the language; it requires that any contention, to be suc-
cessfully persuasive, must make some kind of sense in terms
of the reason; it provides a real stimulus toward, though
not an assurance of, corrective growth rather than strait-
jacketing of the Code by way of caselaw.
24
21Id. § 1-102(1). For a discussion of the role of policy under the Code, see
D. KNG, THE NEW CONCEPrUALSm Or THE UNisonu COMERCIAL CODE 8-14
(1968).
22See Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 632 (1975). Of course, the draftsmen of the Code
who worked under the aegis of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and the American Law Institute were not legislators. Nevertheless,
the painstaking way in which they assembled a complete code and the compara-
tively summary acceptance of the final product by state legislatures, permits one to
speak of the drafters as the authors of the legislation. For the most part, the legis-
latures simply validated the purposes and policies of the private draftsmen, trans-
forming their recommendations into public policy. See generally 3. HoNNor., Tim
LAw op SA s Azm SALEs FnAN CIG 5-6 (4th ed. 1976).
23 Collection of Karl Llewellyn Papers, J, VI, I, e at 5 (1944) (unpublished
manuscript on file at University of Chicago Law School), quoted in W. TwnING,
K.L Lxwvr YN AND E RrAs MovmdnEN 321-22 (1973).
24 Id&
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Because an objective is usually indicated in a statute itself in
but a terse or suggestive manner, the drafters provided a fuller
delineation of purpose in the Official Comments to individual Code
sections. Although it has not been frequently noticed, the textual
portion of the Comments is headed "Purposes" or "Purposes of
Change." These express statements of purpose follow citations to
prior uniform statutory provisions. The reader is invited to com-
pare a particular Code provision with these earlier texts in order to
understand better its remedial function.
The drafters' attempt to use the commentary to facilitate pur-
posive construction was linked with the underlying goal of uni-
formity. As stated in the introductory Comment to the Code:
Uniformity throughout American jurisdictions is one of
the main objectives of this Code; and that objective cannot
be obtained without substantial uniformity of construction.
To aid in uniform construction these Comments set forth
the purpose of various provisions of this Act to promote
uniformity, to aid in viewing the Act as an integrated
whole, and to safeguard against misconstruction. 25
A similar theme is evident in the Official Comment to section 1-102
which states:
The text of each section should be read in the light of the
purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as
also of the Act as a whole, and the application of the lan-
guage should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case
may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies in-
volved.20
The unrestrained impetus of purpose is dramatized by the sugges-
tions in the same Comment that courts implement "a statutory
policy with liberal and useful remedies not provided in the statutory
text," and disregard "a statutory limitation of remedy where the
reason of the limitation does not apply." 27 The official commentary
indicates that, at least at times, articulated purpose is to control
statutory text in Code interpretation.
As drafting the Code gave the realists a unique opportunity to
legislate purposive interpretation, so experience under the Code
now provides a basis for evaluating this distinctive approach. The
25U.C.C., Comment (1962 official version), riepinted in R. Bn~csm &
A. SuTmRLAND, COMmERCIAL TRmsAcTiONS 1 (1968 ed.).
26 U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1.
271d.
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considerable body of decisions that construe the Code include opin-
ions unequivocally embracing purposive interpretation and others
totally disregarding it. Part II of this Article explores ways in
which courts have avoided purposive readings; their disregard of
the realist message is contrasted with a purposive reading of the
same provisions. Part III seeks to deduce from cases utilizing pur-
posive interpretation an explanation of how the procedure works.
These cases are analyzed in light of some of the insights of lin-
guistic philosophy in order to show how reference to purpose
minimizes the impact of certain features of language and draftsman-
ship that might otherwise distort the interpretation process. Part
IV then explores the limitations of purposive interpretation. An
effort is made therein to grapple with the problem caused by con-
fficting purposes.
Because of the way in which the Code was constructed and the
nature of its subject matter, U.C.C. litigation is a special arena.
Nonetheless, as will be argued, the results that can be obtained
through purposive interpretation of the Code, and the limitations
on that technique revealed in this special context, have an impact
on the larger jurisprudential debate over judicial discretion. These
jurisprudential implications will emerge throughout the develop-
ment of this Article and are summarized in the Conclusion.
II. JUDICIAL DISREaRD) OF PuRPosIVE INTERPRETATION-
PROPER AND IMPROPER METHODOLOGIES
A. Retreat to "Plain Meaning"
1. The Farmer as Merchant
Issues that appear simple have generated considerable con-
troversy under the Uniform Commercial Code. Consider the widely
discussed question: "Is a farmer a merchant for purposes of article 2
of the Code?" Litigation raising this question has centered on
section 2-201(2), which is part of the Statute of Frauds controlling
contracts involving the sale of goods. The section provides that the
requirement that a contract for the sale of goods priced at $500 or
more must be in writing to be enforced is satisfied in the following
circumstances:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing
in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the
sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to
know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection
1978]
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(1) against such party unless written notice of objection to
its contents is given within 10 days after it is received.28
As indicated by the emphasis, this alternative is available only
when both buyer and seller are merchants. Can a farmer who sells
only his own produce be regarded as a merchant? Changes in
markets for agricultural products have contributed to repeated
litigation turning on this issue. In each instance, a merchant-buyer
alleged an oral contract to purchase a farmer's crop that had been
followed by a written confirmation, to which the farmer asserted a
Statute of Frauds defense; in the background, market prices for the
crop had risen above the price set by the alleged agreement.
Unfortunately, perhaps, an early judicial examination of the
question not only arose in an agricultural state-Arkansas-but also
in a case in which the factual record was deficient. In Cook Grains.,
Inc. v. Fallis,29 the Arkansas court commenced its analysis of the
section 2-201(2) issue by quoting the Code's definition of "merchant"
in section 2-104(l):
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the
kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or
skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or
broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill. 30
After quoting the statutory language, and briefly reporting that
the record did not indicate whether the farmer-defendant in ques-
tion fit the statutory definition,31 the Cook Grains court made no
further attempt to analyze that language or otherwise define the
policy it sought to promote. Instead, the court turned to Words
and Phrases for definitions successively of a farmer ("one devoted
to the tillage of the soil" 82) and of merchants (those "who make it
their living to buy and sell by a continued vivacity or frequent
negotiations in the mystery of merchandise, and does not include a
farmer who sells what he makes" 3). Arguably the Arkansas court
28 Id. § 2-201(2) (emphasis supplied).
29239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965).
30Id. at 964, 395 S.W.2d at 556 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-104(1)).
31Id.
3 2 Id. (quoting 16 WoADs AND PHRASES 402 (penn. ed. 1959) (citing Sohner
v. Mason, 136 Cal. App. 2d 449, 452, 288 P.2d 616, 617 (1955))).
33 239 Ark. at 965, 395 S.W.2d at 557 (quoting 27 WoRDs AiN PnRASES 136
(penn. ed. 1959) (citing Dyott v. Letcher & McKee, 29 Ky. (6 1.1. Marsh.) 542,
544-45 (1831))).
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turned to such definitions only because of the paucity of evidence
in the record concerning the "merchant-like" qualities of this par-
ticular farmer; its holding was, therefore, limited to the case before
it. Such an explanation is belied, however, by the court's broad
statement that "[o]ur attention has been called to no case, and we
have found no holding that the word farmer may be construed to
mean merchant." 34 By the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the
words the farmer was not a merchant; 35 enforcement of the alleged
contract was therefore barred by the Statute of Frauds.
What is plain and ordinary in Arkansas, however, is not neces-
sarily so in Texas. Addressing the farmer as merchant issue in
Nelson v. Union Equity Co-operative Exchange,36 the Texas Su-
preme Court started by criticizing the Arkansas court for referrring
to an ordinary meaning of merchant when the Code specified its own
definition in section 2-104(l). 37 The Texas court then dissected
the Code definition into four prongs:
Under that definition, a person is a "merchant" if he (1)
deals in goods of the kind, or (2) by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices involved in the transaction, or (3) by his occupa-
tion holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar
to the goods involved in the transaction, or (4) employs an
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as
having such knowledge or skill, and that knowledge or skill
may be attributed to the person whose status is in question.
If the facts show that a person satisfies any of the above
criteria, then we are bound to hold that person to be a
merchant.
38
Turning to the first of the alternative prongs, dealing in goods,
the Nelson court correctly noted that the U.C.C. does not define
the term "deal." In the absence of a statutory definition, the court
felt free to consult Black's Law Dictionary ("to traffic; to transact
34 Id. at 964, 395 S.W.2d at 556-57. Furthermore, the court defined the
breadth of its holding in stating that, "There is nothing whatever in the statute
indicating that the word 'merchant' should apply to a farmer when he is acting in
the capacity of a farmer, and he comes within that category when he is merely
trying to sell the commodities he has raised." Id. at 965, 395 S.W.2d at 557.
35 The final word of the Arkansas court on the farmer as merchant question
was a quotation of the maxim: "In construing a statute its words must be given
their plain and ordinary meaning." Id. at 965, 395 S.W.2d at 557 (citations
omitted).
36 548 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1977).
37 Id. 355. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
38Id.
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business" 39) and Ballentine's Law Dictionary ("to buy or to sell" 40)
for the "plain meaning" of this term. Under the definitions the
court selected, any farmer who got his crop to market would be
a merchant.41
Evidently, all farmers are merchants in Texas; 42 and no farmer
is a merchant next door in Arkansas. In both the Cook Grains and
Nelson opinions an obvious disregard of drafting purpose con-
tributed to the disparity of results. Both courts retreated to the
most discredited of techniques, invocation of plain or dictionary
usage as the final word on meaning, as an alternative to purposive
interpretation. The advantage of this approach from the perspec-
tive of the Arkansas court was that it enabled the court to pursue
a policy of its own: protecting farmers from the additional respon-
sibilities imposed by article 2 of the Code on merchants. 3 The
advantage for the Texas court was its ability to carry a Code policy
beyond the constraints imposed on that policy by the draftsmen.
Section 2-201(2) was designed to limit an inequity that arose
under pre-Code law which limited the enforcement of confirming
memoranda to cases in which the party charged with breach of
contract had signed the memorandum. 44 Under that rule a con-
39Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICnONARY 487 (4th ed. 1968)).
40 Id. (quoting BAix.mr 's LAw DircoNARY 308 (3d ed. 1969)).
41 The Texas court did go on to hold that farmer Nelson satisfied the second
and third criteria of the statutory definition of merchant, and in so doing the court
focused on his knowledge of the commercial practices involved in the business of
growing and selling wheat. Id. 355-57. The court's alternative holdings were
consistent with a purposive reading of U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
42 Although the Nelson decision can arguably be limited to the facts presented
to the court, clearly the implications of the holding with regard to the first prong of
the definition of "merchant" under U.C.C. § 2-104(1) are as broad as the statement
in the text. The dissenting justices in the Nelson opinion stated that "[tlhe unfor-
tunate result of the majority decision is . . . that every farmer in Texas is held to
be a 'merchant."' Id. 360 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Lower courts in Texas have
not interpreted the Nelson opinion as being limited to its facts. See, e.g., Gray v.
Kirkland, 550 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
43 Other agricultural states have followed the Cook Grains decision. See, e.g.,
Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975); Decatur Coop.
Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976). The Urban ruling has actually
been defended in student commentary on the grounds that treating farmers as
merchants might cause them to abandon their vocation, thus threatening the back-
bone of the state's economyl 16 WAsimuRN L.J. 230, 236 (1976). The manner
in which the "plain meaning" rule frees a court to produce its own legislation has
been repeatedly recognized by commentators criticizing this approach; indeed, this
effect of the rule may explain why courts cling to it despite the strong academic
consensus against the doctrine. See generally Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and
Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WAsH. U.L.Q. 2, 5-7
(1939); Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory
Interpretation in the "Moderm " Federal Courts, 75 CoLum. L. B.v. 1299 (1975).
44 Llewellyn's comments to this provision when it was first formulated as
§ 14(2) of the Revised Sales Act are instructive. See ALI Uunmou REVIsED
SALus AcT § 14, Comment (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
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firming memo bound its sender to an enforceable contract but left
the party receiving it free to speculate on the market price. If the
price declined, he could enforce the contract; if the price rose,
he could assert the Statute of Frauds to bar enforcement. The
Statute operated to discourage the use of confirming memos. Un-
doubtedly, the Texas court suspected farmer Nelson of just such
speculation. In the court's judgment the need to prevent such
speculation and to facilitate the execution of "forward contracts"
by the oral agreement-written confirmation procedure outweighed
any burden on the farmer:
[T]he burden on the "merchant" seller of grain is light;
all he must do is read his mail and object within ten days
to the contents of the confirmatory memorandum. On the
other hand, it would be a far greater burden on merchant
buyers of grain to require them to execute forward sales
with farmers such as Nelson by using methods other than
confirmatory memoranda.
45
The flaw in this reasoning is that it does not focus on the policy
contemplated by the drafters when they explicitly limited section
2-201(2) to transactions "between merchants."
How would a jurist seriously concerned about the policy re-
flected in this limitation determine that policy? This Article
contends that, for reasons specified in Part III,4 1 a purposive inter-
preter might appropriately analogize his task to that of a translator
grappling with the text of a masterpiece of German philosophy.
Such a translator would undoubtedly pour over the German text,
not only analyzing each passage, but also viewing the work as a
whole, to assure that he accurately conveyed the author's message.
Thus, the first step in purposive interpretation is: Start with the
statutory language and read it all with an eye to the underlying
purpose.47 Section 2-201(2) does not apply to "merchants" but to
contracts "between merchants." The phrase "between merchants"
is separately defined in section 2-104(3). It embraces "any transac-
tion with respect to which both parties are chargeable with the
knowledge or skill of merchants." 48 A judicial definition of the
term merchant that left courts free to ignore the knowledge and
skill of the particular farmer involved would be inappropriate.
45 Nelson v. Union Equity Coop. Exch., 548 S.W.2d 352, 357-58 (Tex. 1977).
46 See text accompanying notes 134-90 infra.
4 7 This step is modified at text accompanying notes 97-99 infra.
48 U.C.C. § 2-104(3) (emphasis supplied).
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When the Texas court in Nelson dissected section 2-104(1) into
alternative prongs it neglected to include the crucial word "other-
wise" as part of its second and third prongs.49 That word implies
that dealing "in goods of the kind" alone was not visualized by the
draftsmen as sufficient evidence of a party's status as a merchant,
but rather as one way in which a potential seller "by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the prac-
tices or goods involved in the transaction." 50
Having learned from close scrutiny of the statutory text that
knowledge or skill was evidently important to the drafters, the
purposive interpreter, following the example of a translator, might
next turn to the materials in which the drafters had announced their
objectives-the Comments. 51 The Code was formulated with the
assumption that text and Comments would be considered as a unit.
5 2
Thus, the second step in purposive interpretation is: Look for
articulation of purpose in the Official Comments. Comment 1 to
section 2-104 shows that the drafters felt that certain "special and
clear rules" should be applied to professionals, but not to the casual
or inexperienced seller or buyer. Comment 2 painstakingly, but
clearly, explains that "professional status under the definition may
be based upon specialized knowledge as to the goods, specialized
knowledge as to business practices, or specialized knowledge as to
both," depending on the nature of the provision involved. For
example, the Comment asserts that a party is to be held to the
mercantile standard of good faith under section 2-103(l)(b) if he
has specialized knowledge of either the goods or practices involved.
But the implication of a warranty of merchantability through section
2-314 is expressly conditioned on expertise in regard to the goods
themselves. The exception to the Statute of Frauds requirement
expressed in section 2-201(1), along with other article 2 provisions
dealing with the battle of the forms (section 2-207) and firm offers
49 Compare text accompanying note 30 supra with text accompanying note 38
supra.
50 U.C.C. § 2-104(l).
51 See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
52 The appropriate weight to be given the Comments in Code interpretation
has been the subject of considerable discussion. See Skilton, Some Comments on
the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 Wis. L. IRv. 597 (1966).
An obvious point, worth repeating, is that the text to the Code has been enacted
by state legislatures; the Comments were not. See J. HOCNoLD, supra note 22, at
12. Nonetheless, it has been acknowledged that the Comments are "the main device
for articulating and explaining the policies of the Code provisions." W. Twi-nIG,
supra note 23, at 326. Skilton has concluded that "study of the Comments is
indispensable to a knowledge of the Code." Skilton, supra, at 631.
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(section 2-205), is premised on knowledge of such non-specialized
business practices as answering mail.
By now the purposive interpreter is aware that the words "be-
tween merchants" in section 2-201(2) are part of a broader policy of
imposing higher standards on professionals than nonmerchants. At
this point he should have some confidence that he appreciates what
the drafters sought to achieve. Nevertheless, if the purposive inter-
preter wants to be sure that he has captured every nuance of possible
meaning he should take the additional step of examining the history
of the text or the problem before him. Just as a translator of a
German philosophical treatise would want to read prior drafts of
his author's manuscript and become familiar with earlier discussions
that served as a backdrop for the masterwork, so a jurist dedicated
to effectuating legislative policy will want to follow similar pro-
cedures. Thus, the third step in purposive interpretation of the
U.C.C. is: Explore how the present statutory text varies from earlier
drafts of the Code and from the treatment of the same subject in
pre-Code law. For example, the history of section 2-104 3 reveals
the following:
1. As shown by the cross-reference to "Prior Uniform Statutory
Provision" in the Comment to section 2-104 the term "merchant"
was not separately defined or employed in the Uniform Sales Act or
other uniform laws. Nevertheless, the Comment describes seven
provisions of earlier statutes as "examples of the policy expressly
provided for in this Article." 14 Only two of those provisions use
an expression similar to the use of "merchant" in article 2. Under
section 15(2) of the Uniform Sales Act a warranty of merchantability
is imposed on sales "by description from a seller who deals in goods
of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or
not)." 5r Under section 16(c) a similar warranty is imposed on sales
by sample "[i]f the seller is a dealer in goods of that kind." 56
2. In fact, the policy of formulating certain obligations of mer-
chants separately from those of nonmerchants through the enact-
ment of different legal standards is new with the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. The Anglo-American common law tradition did not treat
53 Of course the purposive interpreter should also examine the history of
§ 2-201(2).
54 U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment. Those prior statutory provisions referred to are:
UNwomi SArEs AcT §§15(2), 15(5), 16(c), 45(2), 71; UNFomm Brns or
LADING Ar §§ 35, 37.
5
r UN,,,woir SALEs Ac§ § 15(2) (emphasis supplied).
56 UNywormi SAtis Acr § 16(c).
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merchants as a distinct class. In departing from that tradition the
Code's drafters were borrowing from civil law doctrine.5i Thus,
the merchant category is a distinctive feature of the U.C.C.
3. The Code policy appeared first in the draft of the Uniform
Revised Sales Act prepared by Llewellyn as a pilot project for
article 2 of the Code. In section 7(1) of that draft the definition of
merchant was substantially identical to that in current section 2-104,
except the language "who deals in goods of the kind" did not
appear.5" This language crept into the November, 1951 Final Text
Edition without explanation.5 9
4. In an elaborate note to his draft of the Uniform Revised
Sales Act, Llewellyn justified a separate formulation of merchants'
rules on the ground that courts had in fact treated merchants
differently by manipulating such concepts as "usage of trade," "the
circumstances of the case," or "on the contract, express or implied."
He explained that persons were not to be classified as merchants
"arbitrarily" but rather on the basis of their knowledge, and illus-
trated this principle with the following example:
A farmer has a small farm and apple orchard, market-
ing three to six hundred bushels a year. With respect to
the warranty of merchantability under Section 38 he is a
merchant, since his experience and position necessarily
charge him with packing in full accordance with what the
description means in the market, as also with the truthful-
ness of any labelling of his packages. But Section 20(b),
which incorporates into the contract additional minor terms
stated in a "confirmation," depends upon the established
practice of regular merchants to attend and reply promptly
to correspondence. No such practice exists among small
farmers, and no material term which is adverse to such a
farmer is to be incorporated into the contract on the basis
of that section. His occupation does not hold him out as
familiar with any practice "of the kind involved" or as
having the general knowledge or skill in that aspect of a
person in trade. By contrast, a large-scale farmer who is
using standard business marketing methods is with respect
57 See Corman, The Law of Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code, in
SECTION OF CoRPORATION, BM samN & BusnEss LAW, ABA, UNiFODm CoMMERCIAL
CODE HAsnBooK 21, 22-25 (1964); Dolan, The Merchant Class of Article 2:
Farmers, Doctors, and Others, 1977 WAsu. U.L.Q. 1 (1977).
58 Compare ALI UNwnOso REvisED SALEs AcT § 7(1) (Proposed Draft No. 1,
1944) with U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
59 U.C.C. § 2-104 (final text ed. 1951).
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to all the transaction concerned a person in trade and
therefore a "merchant." 60
Purposive interpretation of section 2-201(2) reveals that two
policies are operating in that section: first, the Code attempts to
reduce inequity in the operation of the Statute of Frauds by pro-
viding that a memo that obligates the sender also binds the receiver;
second, a distinct and important counterpolicy limits the first by
protecting those who are unfamiliar with such mercantile practices
as the seller's custom of relying on a confirming memo and the
buyer's need to reply to inaccurate memos promptly and in writing.
Whether a given farmer is a merchant under section 2-201(2) should,
if the methods of purposive interpretation are applied, depend on
his business sophistication. Several courts, without engaging in the
full process of interpretation outlined above, have concluded that a
farmer's status is dependent on this type of factual inquiry.61
2. Other "Plain Meaning" Cases
The farmer as merchant cases have by no means been the
Code's only encounter with the "plain meaning" rubric. Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine a more direct frustration of legislative pur-
pose than occurred in West Side Bank v. Marine National Exchange
Bank,6 a decision concerning the time limit on the deferred posting
privilege accorded by article 4 to drawee banks. 3 Under deferred
posting, a bank is allowed time after receipt of a check drawn on it
to determine if the check is to be dishonored or paid. A provisional
settlement, normally a credit to an account, is made upon receipt
of the check before a decision is reached whether to pay it. The
steps taken by a bank in making this determination to pay, such as
checking for sufficiency of funds or stop orders, and verifying sig-
natures, is called "posting" the item. The drawee needs time to
complete this investigation, but those who have sent the check for
collection are also entitled to a prompt decision without collusive
footdragging by the drawee bank and its customer, the drawer of
6O ALI UnNwoRm REvism SAx-ss Aar § 7, Comment, Illustration 2 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
61 E.g., Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 19 UCC REP. 52 (W.D. Wis. 1976);
Continental Grain Co. v. Harbach, 400 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Rush
Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Missouri Farmer Ass'ns, Inc., 555 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. App.
1977); see Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Ill. 2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975). In a recent
Article Professor Dolan has argued that although some farmers can be considered
merchants under the Code, not all farmers are. See Dolan, supra note 57, at 14-24.
6237 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968).
63 See U.C.C. § 4-301, Comment 1.
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the check. Article 4 limits the drawee to a specified time period in
which to make its decision to pay.64 The check must be dishonored
before the time of "final payment," or the drawee becomes account-
able for it and can no longer reverse its provisional settlement.6 5
"Final payment," the critical time limit in the collection process, is
defined in section 4-213(1) as follows:
An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank
has done any of the following, whichever happens first:
(a) paid the item in cash; or
(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to
revoke the settlement and without having such right under
statute, clearing house rule or agreement; or
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the
indicated account of the drawer, maker or other person to
be charged therewith; or
(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and
failed to revoke the settlement in the time and manner
permitted by statute, clearing house rule or agreement.66
Most checks are finally paid under subsection (d) when a bank fails
to reverse a provisional settlement it has made before its "midnight
deadline" 67 or some other time limit fixed by clearing house rule
or agreement.
The Code provisions dealing with deferred posting were not
thought troublesome until the advent of computerization. In com-
puterized systems the logical order of checking a drawer's account
before charging it for the item is not generally followed. Instead,
under the normal pattern, all checks are first processed by the com-
puter which marks them paid, charges the accounts of the drawers,
and makes various reports concerning them, such as labeling certain
checks as "large items" or "insufficient funds." A bank official armed
with these reports then determines whether to pay a particular item.
If a decision to dishonor is made, the computer's previous actions
are reversed.
Bankers, particularly those in California, feared that the com-
puters' reversal of mechanical and judgmental factors in the posting
process could result in a judicial determination of a premature final
64 See id. § 4-213.
65 See id. §4-212(1).
66Id. §4-213(1).
67 The "midnight deadline" for a bank is midnight on the next banking day
following the banking day on which it receives the item. Id. § 4-104(1) (h).
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payment under section 4-213(l)(c). In order to allay this fear, the
Code's Permanent Editorial Board approved in 1962 the addition
to the uniform text of a new section 4-109, defining the "process of
posting." 6s It reads:
The "process of posting" means the usual procedure
followed by a payor bank in determining to pay an item
and in recording the payment including one or more of the
following or other steps as determined by the bank:
(a) verification of any signature;
(b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available;
(c) affixing a "paid" or other stamp;
(d) entering a charge or entry to a customer's ac-,
count;
(e) correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous
action with respect to the item.
This was the langnage that the Wisconsin court dealt with in
the West Side Bank case. The check in question had been mechani-
cally charged to the drawer's account by Marine National Exchange
Bank's computer, and this action had been allowed to stand by a
bookkeeper who reviewed the computer report. Thereafter, Marine
received a stop-order from its customer, the drawer of the check.
Marine dishonored the check before its time ran out under section
4-213(1)(d), but West Side Bank, who had presented the check to
Marine for payment, claimed that Marine had finally paid it under
section 4-213(l)(c). There was no doubt that the computers had
caused a premature final payment before Marine lad the oppor-
tunity to decide whether to pay the check. Nevertheless, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that final payment had not occurred
because section 4-109 allowed "reversing an entry." It stated:
It would appear whatever rationaliae may be offered to
the contrary, and they are numerous, reason must yield to
the plain meaning of the statute. No limitation is set forth
in the legislation. The phrase the legislature used was
"reversing an entry." Only by the most strained inter-
pretation is it possible to glean from the face of the statute
the inference that the entry must have been made in error.
While the legislative intent may have been otherwise, and
there is evidence that some authors prominent in the
68 The purpose of the provision is clearly stated in PmxnANFENT EDrrOHIAL BD.
FOR THE UCC, REP. No. 2, at 80-81 (1965).
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preparation of the Code concluded that only erroneous
entries were intended, yet it is not within the province of
this Court to seek secondary sources of legislative intent
where the meaning of the statute is plain and unambiguous.6 9
The court focused on the language of section 4-109(e); it
neglected the relationship of this language to the provision as a
whole. Correcting "an entry" is only one step which a bank may
take "in determining to pay an item." In the context of the facts of
West Side Bank, the word "entry" is clear; there was no doubt that
the drawee bank made an entry to the drawer's account and later
reversed it. The meaning of "in determining to pay an item" in
section 4-109 is, however, ambiguous. Is the determination made
when a bank official in fact decides to pay or when the legal time
limits enacted in section 4-213(1) cause a final payment to be ef-
fectuated? 70 This ambiguity is confirmed by the effect of the West
Side Bank ruling. It rendered section 4-213(1)(c) superfluous be-
cause final payment could not occur under that provision at any
time earlier than that fixed by section 4-213(l)(d). The analysis of
the court did not conform to the first step of purposive interpreta-
tion: to read all of the statutory text with an eye to the underlying
theme. The court also failed to follow the second step by ignoring
the Comment to section 4-109 which indicates that the process of
posting is complete as soon as both judgmental and mechanical acts
have occurred.71 The court also violated the third step by failing to
consider the underlying problem of computerization which spawned
the language of section 4-109 in the first instance.
72
Fortunately, purposive interpretation of the Code has not al-
ways been subordinate to the "plain meaning" rule. It survived a
close brush with the doctrine in Fairchild Industries v. Maritime
09 37 Wis. 2d at 669-70, 155 N.W.2d at 591-92 (footnote omitted).
7 0 In fairness to the court it should be noted that this ambiguity was obscured
by the failure of defendant, the drawee bank, to make timely objection to affidavits
offered by West Side in which it disputed Marine's claim that its procedures
included a final step of exercising a second judgment as to whether any entries
should be reversed. It does not appear, however, that the affidavits established
that Marine did in fact reexamine its decision to pay in all or a significant number
of cases. In spite of the factual ambiguity, West Side asserted that Marine had
made final payment as a matter of law even under Marine's statement of the facts.
See 37 Wis. 2d at 665-67, 155 N.W.2d at 589-90.
71 The process of posting "involves the two basic elements of some decision to
pay and some recording of the payment." U.C.C. § 4-109, Comment.
72 For a purposive interpretation of § 4-109 that refuses to follow the West
Side Bank approach, see H. Schultz & Son, Inc. v. Bank of Suffolk County, 22
UCC laP. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
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Air Service Ltd.73 The issue presented in Fairchild was whether a
disclaimer of implied warranties describing the sale as "as is" was
required to be conspicuous. The problem resulted from the way in
which sections 2-316(2) and (3) of the Code were drafted. They read:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the
implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the
language must mention merchantability and in case of a
writing must be conspicuous ....
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all im-
plied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is",
"with all faults" or other language which in common
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion
of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied war-
ranty; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modi-
fied by course of dealing or course of performance or usage
of trade.74
Three of the seven judges on Maryland's Court of Appeals felt
that the issue could be resolved by simply looking to the definition
of "notwithstanding" in Webster's Dictionary. When used as a
preposition, "notwithstanding," according to Webster's, means "in
spite of." "r Accordingly, these three dissenting judges concluded
that under section 2-316(3) the terms "as is" and "with all faults'"
could exclude implied warranties without regard to the requirement
of conspicuousness stated in section 2-316(2). The dissent made no
attempt to define what policy might be served by allowing "with all
faults" or "as is" disclaimers to exclude warranties even when those
expressions are hidden in a form contract, although other disclaimer
language must be "so written that a reasonable person against whom
it is to operate ought to have noticed it." 76 In so doing the opinion
seems to subscribe to what has been called the "flagellant" theory of
statutory construction-if the legislators' draftmanship is defective,
the courts will teach them to improve by taking them literally.
7T
73274 Md. 181, 333 A.2d 313 (1975).
74 U.C.C. §§ 2-316(2), (3)(a), (3)(c) (emphasis supplied).
75274 Md. at 191 n.2, 333 A.2d at 319 n.2 (Singley, J., dissenting) (quoting
WEBsmRn's NEW INTERNATxoNAL DIcrroNARY 1669 (2d ed. 1944)).
76 This is the basic definition of "conspicuous" set forth in U.C.C. § 1-201(10).
77 H. HAuT & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAINGc
AND APPLiCATION oF LAW 99-100 (tent. ed. 1958).
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Judge Singley, writing for the dissenters in Fairchild, stated: "In
matters involving statutory construction, I follow Lord Mildew's
dictum in Bluff v. Father Gray, 'If Parliament does not mean what
it says, it must say so.' "7
Fortunately, Judge Singley was unable to convince the majority
of his colleagues who exhibited a basic understanding of at least the
first two steps of purposive interpretation. First, looking at the
statutory text as a whole, the majority found the target of the word
"notwithstanding" to be uncertain.
It is evident, of course, that the words "as is" consti-
tute an exception to the general rule, contained in sub-
section (2), pertaining to an exclusion or modification of
warranties, but it is not clear, as Fairchild would have us
hold, that those words go so far as to obviate the conspicu-
ousness requirement in subsection (2). In the case of an
implied warranty of merchantability, subsection (2) re-
quires use of the word "merchantability," and if in writing,
that it be conspicuous. An "as is" disclaimer eliminates
the requirement of the word "merchantability," but it is
not clear from this language that the disclaimer, if in writ-
ing, need not be conspicuous. With respect to the exclu-
sion of an implied warranty of fitness, subsection (2) re-
quires that it be in writing and conspicuous, but it is
unclear from subsection (3)(a) which of these requirements
is dispensed with by the use of the "as is" disclaimer.
7 9
Because of this lack of clarity, the majority was willing to glean the
real legislative intent and allow it to prevail over "literal meaning."
They found an unequivocal statement of purpose in Comment 1 to
section 2-316:
This section is designed principally to deal with those fre-
quent clauses in sales contracts which seek to exclude "all
warranties, express or implied." It seeks to protect a buyer
from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer
by denying effect to such language when inconsistent with
language of express warranty and permitting the exclusion
of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or
other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise.
80
78274 Md. at 191, 333 A.2d at 319 (Singley, J., dissenting) (quoting
A. HERBERT, UNCOAmMONq LAw 192 (1936)). The reference is to a fictional opinion
conceived by A. P. Herbert.
79 274 Md. at 185, 333 A.2d at 315.
8o Id. at 186, 333 A.2d at 316 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1) (emphasis
supplied by court).
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The majority concluded that the purpose of protecting the buyer
from surprise required that "as is" disclaimers also be conspicuous.
In advancing this purposive interpretation the majority did not
derive as much from the language of the statute as they might have.
For example, they did not note that section 2-316(3)(a) expressly
applies "unless the circumstances indicate otherwise," or that "as is"
and "with all faults" disclaimers are merely illustrative examples of
"other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's
attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there
is no implied warranty." I" Although they did bolster their opinion
with Comments 6 and 7 to section 2-316,82 the majority did not turn
to the third step of purposive interpretation and consider the his-
torical context. In particular, they did not try to define those set-
tings in which disclaimers such as "as is" or "with all faults" had
customarily been employed. Had they done so, they would have
discovered that these "magic words" were drawn from bills of sale
in specialized kinds of transactions such as foreclosure sales, the sale
of seconds or rejects, and the sale of second hand goods or goods long
in storage.83  In these special cases, common commercial under-
standing may preclude implied warranties. A precise purposive
interpretation of these disclaimer provisions need not conclude that
all "as is" disclaimers must be conspicuous, but would require that
they either be conspicuous or be used in circumstances in which
commercial understanding negates the presence of implied war-
ranties of quality. Read in this fashion the warranty disclaimer
provision assumes a coherence not detectable from mere reference
to Webster's Dictionary. These provisions are not being touted as
models of draftsmanship; quite the contrary will be maintained in
81 U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (a).
82 Comment 6 states that § 2-316(3) is addressed to "common factual situations
in which the circumstances surrounding the transaction are in themselves sufficient
to call the buyer's attention to the fact that no implied warranties are made or that
a certain implied warranty is being excluded." Comment 7 indicates that § 2-316
(3) (a) is "merely a particularization of paragraph (c) which provides for exclusion
or modification of implied warranties by usage of trade." See 274 Md. at 186-88,
333 A.2d at 316-17.
834 R. IENSON & W. DAVENPORT, UNiFonro LAws ANNOTATED 105 (master
ed. 1968). Judicial disregard of this historic context is not uncommon. See DeKalb
Agresearch, Inc. v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (alternative hold-
ing), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975); Gilliam v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, - Ala.
App. -, 337 So. 2d 352 (1976). Ironically, the Abbott opinion cites Henson and
Davenport for the proposition that an "as is" disclaimer form need not be con-
spicuous, without noting that Henson and Davenport contemplated the use of such
forms only in the special contexts where the absence of the warranty is understood.
391 F. Supp. at 155. The opinion exemplifies the non-purposive technique of
summary reliance on authority examined at text accompanying notes 120-33 infra.
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Part 111.84 Nevertheless, if one considers all of the statutory lan-
guage, the Comments, and the historic context, what at first seems
contradictory may be explained. A purposive interpreter seeks a
vision of purpose equal to the complexity of the draftsmen's under-
taking. Thus, the fourth and final step of purposive construction
is: After considering statutory language, Official Comments and his-
toric context, in seriatim, examine these factors in combination for
a coherent interpretation.
B. Retreat to the Pre-Code Standard
Another way in which courts have avoided purposive inter-
pretation of the U.C.C. is to translate Code language into a pre-Code
legal standard. A clear example of this methodology is the ill-fated
opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in American Card Co.
v. H.M.H. Co.,85 in which an allegedly secured creditor attempted
to establish its priority in an equity receivership proceeding. The
creditor had filed a standard-form financing statement signed by the
debtor that described certain tools and dies of the debtor as col-
lateral. However, a separate written security agreement had not
been executed. The creditor's agent testified (apparently without
contradiction) that the treasurer of the debtor had agreed to the
designation of the tools and dies as collateral security. Thus, the
court faced the issue whether a standard-form financing statement
could operate as a security agreement where there was only parol
evidence that the parties intended the statement to have that effect.
The creditor invited the court to interpret purposively. Point-
ing to the statutory definition of a security agreement ("an agree-
ment which creates or provides for a security interest") in section
9-105(l)(), the creditor argued that the drafters intended the ques-
tion whether a security interest had been created to be a question
of fact dependent on the parties' words and conduct in the particular
circumstances.8 6 On its facts American Card presented a difficult
case for purposive interpretation because a financing statement may
be filed before the parties have agreed on the terms of the security
arrangement.8 7 The Rhode Island court, however, did not even
make the effort, finding section 9-105(l)(1) to be "not decisive of the
84 See text accompanying notes 157-61 infra.
85 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963).
86 Id. at 61, 196 A.2d at 151-52.
87U.C.C. §9-402(1). The issue is examined from a purposive viewpoint at
text accompanying notes 210-21 infra.
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special problem posed in the instant case." s Instead, it looked to
the language of section 9-203(l)(a) which declares nonpossessory
security interests to be unenforceable unless "the debtor has signed
a security agreement which contains a description of the collateral."
The court then concluded: "The financing statement which the
claimants filed clearly fails to qualify also as a security agreement
because nowhere in the form is there any evidence of an agreement
by the debtor to grant claimants a security interest." 89
Rather than resolve the issue in terms of the Code's own defini-
tion of a security agreement, the court provided its own: a security
agreement must contain a granting clause. In making this transla-
tion, the court lapsed into pre-Code vernacular. The granting
clause is, of course, standard in real estate conveyances and pre-Code
security devices patterned after them, such as the chattel mortgage.
The principal objective of article 9, however, was to simplify the
old law of chattel mortgages and other independent security de-
vices.90 Interpreting the Code in terms of the pre-Code norm was
bound to do violence to this objective.
The effect of such interpretations is illustrated by decisions
like In re Shelton 91 in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to enforce a security arrangement covering an automobile,
even though the debtor had signed an application for a certificate of
title that indicated the existence of the security interest, or Evans v.
Everett 9 2 in which a financing statement was initially held insuffi-
cient even though it recited that the collateral secured a note for
money advanced to produce crops. In these cases, there was written
evidence of existing security interests, but no affirmative language
of conveyance of the type contemplated by the American Card court.
These decisions, predicated on the use of the pre-Code standard,
frustrated the statutory policy of simplifying formalities and effec-
tuating the actual intent of the parties.93 They introduced what the
First Circuit Court of Appeals has described as a "continuing ten-
sion in all cases in this area" between the perceived need to effec-
tuate that intention and the policy of uniform interpretation of
88 97 R.L at 61, 196 A.2d at 152.
Soid. at 63, 196 A.2d at 152 (emphasis supplied).
90 U.C.C. § 9-101, Comment; Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism & Article 9,
47 NEB. L. REv. 659, 668 (1968).
91472 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1973).
92 10 N.C. App. 435, 179 S.E.2d 120, rev'd, 279 N.C. 352, 183 S.E.2d 109
(1971).
93 See Weinberg, Toward Maximum Facilitation of Intent to Create Enforceable
Article Nine Security Interests, 18 B.C. INrus. & Com. L. REV. 1 (1976).
1978]
818 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the Code.94 In fact, courts that construed only the language defin-
ing a security agreement in section 9-105 (or supplemented that
language with their dictionaries) came closer to the results intended
by the drafters. At least they perceived that a writing could "pro-
vide for" a security interest without containing affirmative and
formal present language of conveyance.95
To be sure, at least two policies are manifested in the statement
of the "formal requisites" of a security arrangement in article 9. In
addition to the desire to simplify, there is a countervailing eviden-
tiary policy. The drafters designed section 9-203 as a Statute of
Frauds that would require a written agreement as a condition of
enforceability even against the debtor 96 and would minimize "the
possibility of future dispute as to the terms of the security agreement
and as to what property stands as collateral for the obligation
secured." 97 Clearly the language of the Code itself and the com-
mentary-not a pre-Code formula-is the best guide to the intended
resolution of these conflicting policies.
A preliminary examination of judicial failures to interpret
purposively section 9-203 reveals that the first step of the method-
ology proposed here should be modified in order to focus the inter-
preter's attention on the language of the Code instead of past
formulas, and on the possibility that a multiplicity of purposes
motivated the drafters' language. With the added terminology
emphasized, that step now reads: Start with the statutory language
and read it all as it stands with an eye to the underlying purpose or
purposes and the relationship between them.
The purposive interpreter will encounter instances in which the
statutory language evidences a modification of pre-Code legal stand-
ards, but the drafters' precise purposes are not apparent from their
choice or arrangement of the statutory words, nor do the Comments
and drafting history explain why the new language was selected. He
is-approaching a "Hard Code Case," 98 and must retreat, as indicated
above,9 9 to the perceived impact on the central, albeit general, Code
objectives stated in section 1-102(2). The purposive interpreter
cannot assume that every change in wording from the pre-Code law
was intended to produce substantive changes.
94 In re Numeric Corp., 485 F.2d 1328, 1331 (Ist Cir. 1973).
95 E.g., In re Amex-Protein Dev. Corp., 504 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1974).
96 U.C.C. § 9-203, Comment 5.
97 Id., Comment 3.
98 See text accompanying notes 216-21 infra.
99 See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
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Consider, for example, the duty of a buyer who has accepted
goods to give notice of breach under section 2-607 "within a reason-
able time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach
• or be barred from any remedy .... P" -00 This "notice of
breach" requirement was worded somewhat differently in the Uni-
form Sales Act. The analogous section read:
Acceptance does not bar action for damages.- In the
absence of express or implied agreement of the parties,
acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall not discharge the
seller from liability in damages or other legal remedy for
breach of any promise or warranty in the contract to sell or
the sale. But, if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer
fails to give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise
or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer
knows, or ought to know of such breach, the seller shall not
be liable therefor.101
The differences in the emphasized statutory language could be
construed to make a difference in cases involving late delivery of
goods. In such cases the buyer "knows" of late delivery without
examining the goods; he does not "discover" the breach by examin-
ing the goods after delivery, as he would in a more typical breach
of warranty dispute. Thus, a court might interpret the word "dis-
cover" as an implication that cases of late delivery are totally
exempt from the notice of breach requirement.
In Jay V. Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills, Inc.,10 2 a federal
district court reached this very conclusion, although it was appar-
ently unaware of the contrast between the language of section 2-607
and that of the Sales Act. Attempting the first step of purposive
interpretation, the court concluded that the purpose of the notice
"is to inform the seller of matters which would not normally come
to the buyer's attention until after the goods came into his pos-
session." 103 If the court had turned to the third step of purposive
interpretation, and compared the language of section 2-607 with
its historical antecedents, it could have buttressed its conclusion by
noting the change in language.
Thorough historical analysis, moreover, would have gone be-
yond noting the new statutory language. In studying case law his-
tory, the Zimmerman court would also have learned that decisions
100 U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (a) (emphasis supplied).
:o1 Um~.onm SAtins Acr § 49 (emphasis supplied).
102327 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
1o3 Id. 1204 (emphasis in original).
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under the Sales Act had applied the notice requirement to late
deliveries on the ground that it was designed not merely to inform
the seller of nonconformities, but also to place the seller on notice
that the buyer regarded his conduct as a breach of contract that he
was not willing to waive or disregard.104 When the seller acquired
this information, he would realize that he had to scrutinize the facts
of the transaction, and he must cure, settle, or resist depending upon
his assessment of them. Moreover, if the Zimmerman court, follow-
ing the second step of purposive interpretation, had looked to the
Comments to section 2-607, it would have discovered that the Sales
Act's broader rationale had survived the transition to the U.C.C.
intact: "The notification which saves the buyer's rights under this
Article need only be such as informs the seller that the transaction
is claimed to involve a breach, and thus opens the way for normal
settlement through negotiation." 105 Once the settlement function
of notice of breach is recognized, notice should be required in cases
of late delivery as well as in breach of warranty disputes.10
The section 2-607 example illustrates that not every instance of
changed language in the Code manifests a desire to produce sub-
stantive change. By noting the silence of the Comments on the
change in language and their approval of the settlement function,
which was the basis of pre-Code case law, the purposive interpreter
is able to conclude that the change of wording was not directed at
the late delivery problem.
Two objections could be raised at this point to the course of
purposive interpretation as outlined. First, it might be urged that
purposive interpretation, as illustrated by the analysis of the late
delivery problem, improperly makes the Comments-the statement
of purposes-more authoritative than the statutory text.107 Second,
it could be argued that the Code frequently incorporates, rather
than alters, common law terminology; in such cases the provision
should be construed in light of pre-Code decisions. Both of these
objections may be evaluated with respect to the litigation centering
on section 9-305 of the Code, which exemplifies the continued use
of pre-Code language.
1045 S. WhLIsToN, CoNmAACrs § 714, at 409 (3d ed. 1961). See American
Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 7 F.2d 565 (2d
Cir. 1925); In re Gotham Silver Co., 91 F. Supp. 520 (D.N.J. 1950).
10 U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4.
106 This was the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 970-73 (5th Cir. 1976),
in refusing to follow the Zimmerman decision. The court did not even discuss the
difference in statutory language between the Sales Act and the Code.
107 See note 52 supra & accompanying text.
[Vol. 126:795
PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION OF UCC
Section 9-305 allows security interests in most forms of collateral
to be perfected by pledging, that is, by the secured party taking
possession of the collateral. The section reads:
A security interest in letters of credit and advices of
credit . . . , goods, instruments, negotiable documents or
chattel paper may be perfected by the secured party's tak-
ing possession of the collateral. If such collateral other
than goods covered by a negotiable document is held by a
bailee, the secured party is deemed to have possession from
the time the bailee receives notification of the secured
party's interest. A security interest is perfected by posses-
sion from the time possession is taken without relation
back and continues only so long as possession is retained,
unless otherwise specified in this Article. The security in-
terest may be otherwise perfected as provided in this
Article before or after the period of possession by the
secured party.
The term "possession" is not defined by the Code, but its use clearly
refers to the common law concept. The Comments to section 9-305
begin by declaring: "As under the common law of pledge, no filing
is required by this Article to perfect a security interest where the
secured party has possession of the collateral." "Possession," how-
ever, is not a word with direct ties to concrete experience; it is an
abstract concept that courts have translated in different ways even
within the law of pledges. At times courts have equated possession
in pledge cases with "absolute dominion and control over the prop-
erty." 108 On other occasions, including those involving bulky goods,
they have deemed that something less-"constructive possession"-
would suffice.109 How much of this case-law baggage does the term
"possession" carry with it into the Code?
This question was the dispositive issue in In re Copeland.110
Copeland had guaranteed a loan to one of his enterprises, and he
entered into a pledge agreement covering certain stock to secure his
guaranty. The stock certificates, however, were not delivered to the
creditor. Instead, they were placed in the hands of the Wilmington
Trust Company under an escrow agreement directing that they be
108ln re Dolly Madison Indus., 351 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd
mem., 480 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1973); Qualley v. Snoqualmie Valley Bank, 136
Wash. 42, 238 P. 915 (1925).
10 9 See 1 G. GnmPo, , SEcuErrY INTERESTS n PERSONAL PROPERTY § 14.2 at
440 & n.2 (1965).
110 531 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'g in part 391 F. Supp. 134 (D. Del.
1975).
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held for safekeeping subject to the pledge agreement. The agree-
ment specified that the shares were to be delivered to the creditor
fifteen days after its written demand upon a default of fifteen days
duration in the payment of the loan itself.
Both the common law and the Code contemplate the possibility
of a secured party taking possession of collateral through an agent.
One example of such an agency relationship appears on the face of
section 9-305: "If such collateral other than goods covered by a
negotiable document is held by a bailee, the secured party is deemed
to have possession from the time the bailee receives notification of
the secured party's interest." Nevertheless, the federal district court
in Copeland, after a frank and painstaking review of the authorities,
concluded that the common law required a secured party claiming
possession through his agent or bailee to exercise an "absolute
dominion and control" over the property.11' It further found that
such control could not be achieved by escrow because the escrow
agent's duty is to follow the escrow agreement rather than the in-
structions of the secured party."12  For example, the creditor in
Copeland could not have unilaterally terminated the escrow agree-
ment and obtained possession of the securities prior to default as
would have been possible if the certificates had been left with its
attorney for safekeeping.
Having eliminated Wilmington Trust as a bailee with notice
under the common law, the district court then faced the question
whether the common law doctrine controlled its interpretation of
section 9-305. It concluded that it did not. The court's reasoning,
later upheld by the Third Circuit, reflects use of the methods of
purposive interpretation. The function of the possession require-
ment is to alert third parties that the pledged assets are encumbered.
This purpose is not expressly stated in the text of the Code or the
Comments, but it is central to the pledge idea as set forth in com-
mon law pledge decisions."13 Retention of the pledge as a means of
perfection under the Code manifests a continuation of this policy.
The district court concluded that the escrow arrangement, by plac-
ing the stock in the hands of Wilmington Trust, adequately served
this notice function." 4 As the Third Circuit later explained:
It does not follow . . . that possession of the collateral
must be by an individual under the sole dominion and
111391 F. Supp. at 148.
112 Id. 148-49.
113 See 1 G. GinmoRE, supra note 109, at § 14.1.
11-1391 F. Supp. at 151.
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control of the secured party . . .. Rather, we believe
that possession by a third party bailee, who is not con-
trolled by the debtor, which adequately informs potential
lenders of the possible existence of a perfected security
interest satisfies the notice function underlying the "bailee
with notice" provision of § 9-305.1r,
This example shows how the Code may utilize common law
terminology without incorporating common law doctrine. By iden-
tifying the purpose of section 9-305-to alert third parties to the
existence of perfected security interests-the court in Copeland
properly rejected common law possession doctrine on the facts of the
case before it, because in that context the doctrine was inconsistent
with its purpose.
The Copeland approach also refutes the notion that purposive
interpretation exalts the Code commentary over the text. Either
court in Copeland might have drawn upon commentary that sug-
gests a contrary result to the decision that was-quite properly-
reached. This commentary is appended to section 9-205, which re-
peals the "policing" rule of Benedict v. Ratner.116 That decision
required policing of collateral and its proceeds in the areas of re-
ceivables and inventory financing even if a public filing had been
made. After rejecting the Benedict rule, section 9-205 concludes:
"This section does not relax the requirements of possession where
perfection of a security interest depends upon possession of the col-
lateral by the secured party or by a bailee." The commentary to
section 9-205 carries this statement a step further. It states:
The last sentence is added to make clear that the
section does not mean that the holder of an unfiled security
interest, whose perfection depends on possession of the col-
lateral by the secured party or by a bailee (such as a field
warehouseman), can allow the debtor access to and control
over the goods without thereby losing his perfected interest.
The common law rules on the degree and extent of pos-
session which are necessary to perfect a pledge interest or
to constitute a valid field warehouse are not relaxed by this
or any other section of this Article.2
17
The concluding sentence of this Comment appears directly con-
trary to the reasoning of the Copeland courts. There are reasons,
115 531 F.2d at 1204.
"G0268 U.S. 353 (1925).
117 U.CC. § 9-205, Comment 6 (emphasis supplied).
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however, to reject its applicability to the escrow agent context.
First, the concluding sentence goes beyond the policy stated in the
text of section 9-205 that nothing in "this section" relaxes the com-
mon law rules. Second, as the first sentence of the Comment indi-
cates, the common law result anticipated by the drafters was to assure
that the debtor did not maintain access to or control over the col-
lateral. The decision in Copeland is consistent with this policy.
Third, the Comment is addressed to a different problem than that
faced in Copeland. The concluding sentence of section 9-205 and
Comment 6 were added to the Code after field warehouse interests
urged the drafters to exempt them from the filing requirement on
the ground that the field warehouse is an extended pledge.118 The
drafters wished to ensure in section 9-205 that the field warehouse
was a real, as well as an extended, pledge. Their attention was not
focused on escrow arrangements. Because purposive interpretation
subjects the commentary as well as the text to contextual analysis,
Comment 6 to section 9-205 is not contrary to the result reached in
Copeland, and there need be little fear that purposive interpretation
will lead to the denigration of the authority of the Code's text in
favor of the commentary.
Through its decision, the Copeland court was able to encourage
the use of the escrow arrangement, an important contemporary
commercial device. Such purposive interpretation thus maximizes
statutory flexibility, consistent with one of the Code's central under-
lying objectives.119 The example also demonstrates that the Com-
ments, as such, do not enjoy a priority status in the process of
purposive interpretation. In Copeland, the controlling policy was
articulated in the common law history, and that source of data
shaped the analysis.
C. Retreat to Authority
A third way in which courts avoid reading the Code in light of
its purposes is by interpreting the Code to mean what authorities
say it means. This tendency is not new to commercial law or to
statutory interpretation generally. Professor Gilmore has described
similar experiences under earlier uniform acts:
118 U.C.C. § 9-205 & Comment (1956 Recommendation at 269-70).
19 U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (a) & (b). For a contrasting non-purposive reading of
§ 9-305 that would blunt the adaptive capacity of the Code, see In re Dolly Madison
Indus., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mere., 480 F.2d 917 (3d
Cir. 1973). See also Stein v. Rand Constr. Co., 400 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
But see In re Bialk, 16 UCC REP. 519 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Estate of Hinds, 10
Cal. App. 3d 1021, 89 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1970) (supporting the result in Copeland).
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The general understanding of the profession seems to
have been that the codifying statutes were merely declara-
tory of the common law-like the Restatements of the fol-
lowing generation. Since lawyers knew what the common
law was, there was no particular reason for them to pay
much attention to the statutory text or to take the statute
seriously or even to take it as a statute. In the case of the
Sales Act, this tendency was reinforced by the fact that the
draftsman, Professor Williston, promptly produced a magis-
terial treatise on sales to accompany the statute. In the
Sales Act case law nothing is more common than copious
allusions to and quotations from Williston on Sales; noth-
ing is rarer than a direct reference to the Sales Act itself;
judicial analysis of the statutory text was almost non-
existent. 20
The U.C.C. is not so declaratory of the common law as was the Sales
Act, and we do not have a Willistonian exegesis of it to date.
Nevertheless, courts have not been above retreat to authority on
occasion. One example is Scholl v. Tallman,121 in which the dispute
centered on the common practice of using a check marked "payment
in full" as a means of trying to effect an accord and satisfaction.
Under the common law doctrine of most states, a party receiving
and cashing such a check with respect to a disputed debt was bound
to an accord and satisfaction even though he marked through the
words "payment in full" or wrote "under protest." His act of col-
lecting the check was said to speak louder than any verbal reserva-
tion of rights. 122  The rationale of this doctrine is that under the
bank collection process such instruments will normally be paid with-
out the drawer of the check being afforded the opportunity either
to consent to the deletion of his condition or to withdraw his check.
The question addressed by the court in Scholl was whether this
doctrine had been changed by section 1-207 of the Code. That
provision reads:
A party who with explicit reservation of rights per-
forms or promises performance or assents to performance
in a manner demanded or offered by the other party does
not thereby prejudice the right reserved. Such words as
"without prejudice", "under protest" or the like are suffi-
cient.
120 Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. CoLo. L. REv. 461, 466-67
(1967) (footnote omitted).
121 S.D. -, 247 N.W.2d 490 (1976).
122 6 A. ConmiN, Conr o-,N CONTRAcTs § 1279 at 130 (2d ed. 1962).
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This is a formula of considerable generality, as attested to by its
placement in the introductory article of the Code. Nonetheless, the
South Dakota Supreme Court in Scholl did not attempt to define the
policy section 1-207 seeks to effectuate by reference to the language
of the section or its Comments or history. It stated instead: "The
effect of this section on the doctrine of accord and satisfaction as it
developed at common law has never been addressed by a court of
last resort. We therefore look to other sources for guidance in this
case of first impression." 123 The sources to which the court turned
were:
1) Dictum in a New York county court decision stating that it
would have applied section 1-207 to a reservation of rights on a pay-
ment in full check if it had not already concluded that there was no
accord and satisfaction on the facts of the case because there was no
dispute about the amount owed. 24 A dispute was a necessary pre-
condition to finding consideration for the common law accord and
satisfaction.
2) Language in a North Carolina Court of Appeals decision
(characterized as dictum in Scholl) that did not involve a payment
in full check but a check tendered under a settlement agreement
that arrived after the time required by that agreement. The North
Carolina court said that a reservation of rights on the check pre-
vented it from operating as a full payment.
125
3) A report prepared by Professors Hogan and Penney for the
New York Commission on Uniform State Laws that assumed, with-
out explanation, that section 1-207 operated in the context of a
reservation of rights on a payment in full check.
126
4) A more extensive discussion relying on the previously listed
authorities in Professors Summers' and White's Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
127
123 _S.D. at _, 247 N.W.2d at 492.
124 Hanna v. Perkins, 2 UCC REP. 1044 (Westchester County Ct., N.Y. 1965).
1.25 Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d
85 (1969).
126 COvMzvISSION ON UNIFORM STATE LAWs, NEw Yoax ANNOTATIONS TO
UNIFORM ComrERciAL CODE AND REPORT OF COmIIssION ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws TO LEGiSLATURE OF NEW YORK STATE 19-20 (1961).
1
2 7
J. WsirTE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORMVu CoMMERcIAL CODE § 13-21 (1972).
White and Summers take as their point of departure the view that a check for less
than the contract amount but offered in full settlement "inflicts an exquisite form
of commercial torture on the payee." Id. One observer suggests "overreaching
debtors" such as insurance companies or employers will offer an inadequate check
in order to effect an unconscionable settlement. See Note, Role of the Check in
Accord and Satisfaction: Weapon of the Overreaching Debtor, 97 U. PA. L. REv.
99 (1948).
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The authorities listed were "persuasive" to the South Dakota
court, but those authorities, like the decision itself, eschewed pur-
posive analysis of the provision. They did not start with an effort to
see how the language of section 1-207 correlates with the payment
in full situation. Such an effort would have shown that the cor-
relation is weak. Section 1-207 refers to a party who "performs or
promises performance," or who "assents to performance in a manner
demanded or offered by the other party." A party collecting a check
under reservation of rights does not "perform or promise perform-
ance." By rejecting the check as "payment in full," such a party
specifically rejects the manner in which the check was offered.
Moreover, utilization of the second step of purposive interpreta-
tion would reveal that the commentary strongly suggests that section
1-207 was not aimed at an accord and satisfaction. Comment 1
speaks of providing "machinery for the continuation of performance
along the lines contemplated by the contract despite a pending dis-
pute," while Comment 2 speaks of "interim adjustment in the
course of performance." An accord and satisfaction extinguishes a
dispute; it does not put it on ice.
Finally, turning to the third step of purposive interpretation,
the drafting history of section 1-207 provides interesting, if incon-
clusive, insights. The provision began its Code existence in article
2, the sales article. Llewellyn included the provision in the Revised
Sales Act where it was intended as part of a series of sections aimed
"at smoothing the course of performance." 128 In the early drafts
of the Code it coexisted with a provision in article 3 which expressly
addressed the problem of the payment in full check, allowing it to
operate unless "unconscionable advantage" was taken by the obligor.
This provision extended the common law doctrine of accord and
satisfaction by allowing the payment in full instrument, if collected,
to extinguish claims even in the absence of a dispute. In the Spring,
1950 Draft, section 1-207 was transferred to the introductory article,
but article 3 approval of the payment in full instrument remained.
129
Not until the 1954 Recommendations was the article 8 provision
removed, not because of inconsistency with section 1-207, but "on
the ground that it would work hardship, and was open to abuse." 130
Neither the language, nor commentary, nor history of section
1-207 is independently conclusive. Read together, however, they
128 ALl UNIFO-m REviSED SALEs AcT, Intro. Comment to Part IV-Perform-
ance, § 71-90, at 237 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
129 U.C.C. §§ 1-207, 3-802 (1950 version).
130 U.C.C. § 3-802 & Reason for Change 25 (1954 amendments).
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strongly suggest that the provision was designed to deal with prob-
lems of waiver, election of remedies, and estoppel rather than with
attempted accord and satisfaction.13 1 If the seller in tendering goods
insists, despite a contrary view by the buyer, that, "This is what the
contract provides for," can the buyer accept what he regards as a
significant but non-conforming tender without slipping into a
waiver the pre-Code sales law was so ready to invoke? Can a seller
take a payment after the buyer announces, "This is what I owe you
and I will pay no more," without waiving his claim to a larger
amount? Similar waiver problems arise under other articles of the
Code.132 They do not involve attempts at express compromise but
allegations of waiver based on conduct.
The South Dakota court did not pursue the probable policy of
section 1-207 because it was already committed to the view that a
"payment in full" instrument is undesirable. Indeed, the pre-Code
law in South Dakota rejected the normal common law doctrine on
preservation of rights in this context for the same reason. 33
This Part has described three methodologies used by courts to
avoid purposive interpretation. It has shown that those method-
ologies are not tethered by the legislative will. To understand how
the technique described here as "purposive interpretation" oper-
ates to reflect that will, we must analyze the directive steps outlined
above, and consider the mechanics of the interpretation process.
13 1 The provision has been the focus of government contract litigation involving
waiver-election-estoppel problems. Cities Serv. Helex Inc. v. United States, 543
F.2d 1306 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 455 F.2d 546
(Ct. Cl. 1972). Because the Bailee Lumber case cited by the Scholl court did not
involve tender of a payment in full check, but non-conforming tender of a settlement"
check, it also appears to be concerned with the waiver problem. Support for this
interpretation of § 1-207 can be found in Hawkland, The Effect of U.C.C. f 1-207
on the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check, 74 Com. LJ. 329
(1969); Comment, Accord and Satisfaction: Conditional Tender of Check Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 18 BuFFALO L. REv. 539 (1969).
132 For example, a debtor who receives a notification of disposition of collateral
which he believes does not conform to U.C.C. § 9-504 may nevertheless seek to
maximize the amount received in the disposition, without waiving his right to object
to the sufficiency of the notice. Similarly, a drawee who believes an instrument
presented for payment is late under § 3-506 may nevertheless wish to examine the
instrument and seek to determine if it is otherwise properly payable, without waiving
his right to object to the timeliness of the presentation.
133 _ S.D. at -, 247 N.W.2d at 491-92.
The Scholl court's discussion of § 1-207 was actually superfluous to its result.
It could have merely stated the pre-Code South Dakota rule, and then held that
nothing in the Code displaced that doctrine. Its discussion of § 1-207 was, in
effect, an attempt to preserve South Dakota's peculiar pre-Code doctrine.
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION
A. Objections to Purposive Interpretation
The extent to which courts ignore legislative purpose in Code
,cases reflects a basic skepticism about the utility of using formula-
tions of purpose to guide decisionmakers. To be sure, there are
certain traditional objections to purposive interpretation of any type
of legislation. For example, it has been urged that legislative pur-
pose is essentially unknowable because the legislature is a collective,
the voice of not one but many persons, with varying motives. As
Professor Radin stated long ago: "A legislature certainly has no
intention whatever in connection with words which some two or
three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and
regard to which many of the approving majority might have had,
and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs." 134
Radin's argument confuses legislative purpose with an individ-
ual legislator's motives. The purposive interpreter is not interested
in the secret motives that lead one or more legislators to vote
affirmatively; his inquiry concerns only objectively manifested goals.
This view is consistent with the attitudes of Justices Holmes and
Frankfurter, who objected to talk of legislative "intent." 135 Indeed,
confusion on this point may explain some of the appeal of the
"plain meaning" approach to legislative interpretation. One may
concede that a secret, idiosyncratic meaning attached to legislative
words by even a chief draftsman is not relevant to the force of a
legislative act, however, without concluding that only one ordinary
meaning can be attributed to statutory language.
Another traditional objection to purposive inquiry is that in-
dications of purpose not expressed in the statute itself are likely
to be reflective not of the legislative will but of partisan views that
could not achieve majority approval. Much of the maneuvering
in Congress to make "legislative history" may be subject to criticism
along these lines. 36 This criticism loses most of its force with
Tespect to U.C.C. litigation, however, because of the programmatic
way in which those responsible for the Code project sought
to manifest their objectives in the text and its accompanying
commentary.
137
'34 Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HAnv. L. REv. 863, 870 (1930).
'35 See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLum.
L. REv. 527, 538 (1947); Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HAnv.
L. REV. 417 (1899).
136 See Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAsmn. L. REv. 407,
411-12 (1950); Murphy, supra note 43, at 1316.
137 See notes 19-27 & accompanying text supra; note 52 supra.
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Of greater concern to the purposive interpreter of the Code are
certain contemporary objections to his technique. One of these
objections is that the legislators' inability to predict the future
produces an "indeterminacy of aim." 138 Professor Hart illustrates
this argument with reference to his ordinance barring vehicles from
a public park.18 9 If the purpose of this law is to maintain peace
and quiet, we know that the legislature desired to exclude cars,
buses, and motorcycles:
We have initially settled the question that peace and quiet
in the park is to be maintained at the cost, at any rate, of
the exclusion of these things. On the other hand, until we
have put the general aim of peace in the park into conjunc-
tion with those cases which we did not, or perhaps could
not, initially envisage (perhaps a toy motor-car electrically
propelled) our aim is, in this direction, indeterminate. We
have not settled, because we have not anticipated, the ques-
tion which will be raised by the unenvisaged case when it
occurs: whether some degree of peace in the park is to be
sacrificed to, or defended against, those children whose
pleasure or interest it is to use these things.140
Apart from the legislature's inability to foresee the types of
disputes that will arise, one might contend that statements of pur-
pose, like the statutory text itself, suffer from the infirmities common
to all language. As expressed by Professor Twining: "Statements
of purpose are at least as susceptible as are statements of 'substan-
tive' rules to vagueness, ambiguity, obscurity, difficulty of reconcilia-
tion with other statements, and so on." 141 In order to evaluate the
objections based on the indeterminacy of aim and the infirmities of
language, certain basic features of language itself must be considered.
B. Viewpoints of Linguistic Philosophy
"Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelli-
gence by means of language," wrote Wittgenstein, 142 reflecting the
preoccupation of modem philosophy with linguistic problems. Cer-
tain viewpoints derived from this preoccupation serve to illustrate
how purposive interpretation may assist the decisionmaker, notwith-
138 H. HART, supra note 1, at 125.
139 See text accompanying notes 3-7 supra.
140 H. HAnT, supra note 1, at 126.
141 W. TwDNnG, supra note 23, at 324.
142 L. WrrrcGFsTN, PHsmosopmcAL INVESTIGATIONS 47e (1963).
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standing the objections lodged above. These viewpoints include the
following:
1) Interpretation (or explanation) of language is a process of
translation. An expression which is not clear in a given context
can be translated into a new formula, the impact of which on a
given dispute is more easily demonstrable. Such translation is neces-
sary because of certain characteristics of natural languages, including
their tendency toward ambiguity. Ambiguity exists because a word
or other expression may have more than one meaning. Ambiguity,
however, is not an absolute; its presence and degree are relative to a
certain context and a given interpreter. According to Professor
Black, "a word (or other sign) is ambiguous in a certain usage when
in that occurrence the interpreter (or hearer) is unable to choose
between alternative meanings of the word, any of which would seem
to fit the context." 143 Wittgenstein has illustrated the effect of
translation on ambiguity by imagining a primitive word game played
by a builder and his assistant. When the builder requires a unit of
construction material, he calls out to his assistant the command
"Slab!" The assistant has been trained to respond to this call by
fetching the slab. In some building situations with untrained as-
sistants, however, the builder would have to translate the command
"Slabl" into "Bring me a slabl" This may be necessary because our
language contains the possibility of other meanings of the simple
command "Slabl," such as "Hand me a slab!" or "Bring him a
slab1" 144
Translation may also be appropriate when language is vague.
Vagueness differs from ambiguity in that a vague expression is sub-
ject not to multiple meanings, but rather to uncertainty whether a
given state of affairs is to be embraced within that expression. To
illustrate the nature of vagueness Black utilized the term "chair,"
defined as "a separate seat for one."
One can imagine an exhibition in some unlikely
museum of applied logic of a serious of "chairs" differing
in quality by least noticeable amounts. At one end of a
long line, containing perhaps thousands of exhibits, might
be a Chippendale chair: at the other, a small nondescript
lump of wood. Any "normal" observer inspecting the
series finds extreme difficulty in "drawing the line" between
chair and not-chair. ...
143M. BLACK, CRITCAL ThnEIG 185 (2d ed. 1952).
144 L. Wn-rczNs'-EIN, supra note 142, at 9e.
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[A]t the extremities of the series little or no uncer-
tainty is felt, but the observer grows increasingly doubtful
when the borderline cases in the center are approached:
"everybody" agrees that the Chippendale chair is a chair,
"nobody" wants to sit upon, still less to call a chair, a shape-
less lump of wood, but in intermediate cases personal un-
certainty is a reflection of objective lack of agreement.145
Vagueness is considered to be present, in varying degrees, in all
natural language, 46 and many problems of statutory interpretation
stem from vague legislation. From the point of view of the drafts-
man, however, vagueness is not always a vice. One way to hedge
against his inability to predict future occurrences is to choose termi-
nology with a wide range of indeterminacy. Use of this drafting
technique will invite the judiciary to contract or expand a statutory
classification in light of subsequent developments.
2) The meaning of a message can be best translated by first
viewing the message as a whole, rather than starting with its con-
stituent units. Vagaries of reference such as ambiguity tend to be
dispelled by consideration of the entire message. In fact, when
language is used to make an assertion or command, the meaning of
the words is a function of their use. As explained by Ryle: "Word-
meanings do not stand to sentence-meanings as atoms to molecules
or as letters of the alphabet to the spellings of words, but more
nearly as the tennis-racket stands to the strokes which are or may
be made with it." 147
3) Expressions vary in the degree to which they are abstractions
of sense experience; it is normally easier to apply a less abstract
formula to a given fact situation. This viewpoint mirrors a com-
mon sense attitude, which linguistic philosophy attempts to explain.
The first level of language acquisition-upon which all else is ulti-
mately built-consists of descriptions of events in the concrete world
of material objects. Communication at this level is exemplified by
the occasion sentence. A child seeing a certain animal behaving in
a certain manner, in a certain place, says, "A rabbit is hopping across
the lawn." The truth of this statement can be determined by obser-
vation of the experiential framework in which it was made, a situa-
145 M. BLAck, LANGUAGE & PmrosoPHv 32-33 (1949) (footnotes omitted).
146 Id. 26-28. Both "ambiguity" and "vagueness" should be distinguished, at
least at the conceptual level, from "generality." The generality of an expression
refers to the multiplicity of objects to which it applies. Id. 31.
147 Ryle, The Theory of Meaning, in EAniNOs n, SEmAzmrscs 219, 229 (1974).
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tion which can be observed simultaneously by both the child and
his parent. At this level of discourse, reinforcement of convention-'
ally correct language behavior, or correction of "mistakes," can be
crisp and clear. At more abstract levels of discourse, removed from
concrete experience, the process of reinforcement and correction
does not work so efficiently. A term like "rabbit" is seldom ambigu-
ous; a word like "merchant" enjoys no such advantage.148
Abstraction, like vagueness, can be a virtue. When a particular
characteristic or characteristics are abstracted from the totality of
divergent events, these dissimilar occurrences can be dealt with as a
class. Abstraction produces a generality of reference. Legislation
that seeks to specify the consequences of a range of human actions
must necessarily deal in abstractions. The Code must speak in terms
of "inventory" and "crops," not television sets and cotton plants.
The purposive interpreter does not seek to divine how the
legislature would have decided the particular dispute before him;
the legislature has not spoken in terms of a given contested case.
He instead seeks to use a legislative statement of purpose-an ab-
stract verbal formula-as a guide to how the policy making body
would have him decide the dispute. Some process of translation is
inevitable and reference to an articulated goal is, by its very nature,
the preferred translation technique.
By identifying as desirable a specified outcome for a class of
factually divergent events, a statement of purpose attempts to sum-
marize what the more complex statutory message seeks to achieve.
Thus, a statement of purpose may have a "plumb-line" effect, guid-
ing the development of Code case law along a given policy line.
14
0
For example, purposive interpretation of section 1-207 in Part II
revealed that the provision is aimed at minimizing implicit waivers
or elections by a party's conduct.'"0 On the basis of this underlying
purpose, the interpreter might conclude that the section was not
applicable to a reservation of rights on a payment in full check,
which involves an attempt by express agreement to extinguish con-
tractual rights.
To object to purposive interpretation because one is hesitant
to extend a policy to a given case until exposed to its peculiar facts
merely reflects that more than one policy frequently vie for imple-
148 This account draws on W. Quin, WoiD AND OBjEcT 26-46 (1960) and
A. KoazyBsr, SCIENCE AN SAN= 371-85 (4th ed. 1958). See also Comment,
A Computer Method for Legal Drafting Using Propositional Logic, 53 Txx-s L. REv.
965, 971 (1975).
149 See R. DLAS, JUSPRuDFENCmE 222 (4th ed. 1976).
150 See text accompanying notes 127-32 supra.
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mentation. 151 In those cases the "plumb-line" can function, as will
be shown in Part IV,152 only if a priority among purposes is articu-
lated. If an articulation of purpose is perceived as an abstract state-
ment of a desirable goal rather than as a prediction that governs a
given future case, "indeterminacy of aim" renders an unpersuasive
objection to purposive interpretation. On the other hand, if the
formulation of purpose is merely a statement at the same level of
abstraction as the statutory text, and is subject to the same linguistic
frailties, then it will seldom advance the process of interpretation.
To see how this result can be avoided, it is necessary to examine the
mechanics of purposive inquiry in terms of the insights of linguistic
philosophy.
C. The Mechanics of Purposive Interpretation
1. Semantic Ambiguity
A purposive interpreter, realizing the limitations of language
drawn from the insights of linguistic philosophy described above,153
starts with an appreciation of when translation is necessary.
Whether Jones, a farmer who sells only his own produce, is a "mer-
chant" or not will depend, in the first instance, on how the term
"merchant" is defined. Among the options are these:
a. A merchant is someone who sells goods to earn his live-
lihood.
b. A merchant is someone who buys and sells goods to earn his
livelihood.
c. A merchant is someone who has knowledge of the mercantile
practices associated with the transactions in which he is
engaged.
The question whether to classify Jones as a merchant is a problem
of semantic ambgiuity, a problem of the meaning to be assigned to
the words that trigger a legal formula or specify its consequences.'
5 4
Jones qualifies as a merchant under option a, but not under option
b; we would have to know more about Jones to decide whether he is
151 Hart has recognized this point. His objective in discussing "indeterminacy
of aim" was to show that a judicial decision to extend policy cannot be mechanically
predetermined. See H. HART, supra note 1, at 125-32.
152 See text accompanying notes 205-09 infra.
153 See text accompanying notes 142-48 supra.
154 See Allen & Caldwell, Modem Logic and Judicial Decision Making:
A Sketch of One View, 28 LAw & CorrEEMP. PROB. 213, 228 (1963).
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a merchant under option c. The purposive interpretation of section
2-201(2), outlined in Part II, solved this problem by selecting one
of the options, (c), as the one effectuating the drafters' purpose of
imposing mercantile obligations only on those knowledgeable about
merchant's practices.1 5 This purpose, in relation to the case of
farmer Jones, is less ambiguous than the word "merchant" standing
alone.
A similar process occurred in Part II's discussion of a purposive
interpretation of section 2-607, the notice of breach provision.15 6
"Notice of breach" may require:
a. Notice of the fact of non-conformity.
b. Notice that the buyer regards the seller as having failed to
meet his duties under the contract.
Reference to the Comments to section 2-607(8)(a) reveal that the
provision was designed, as were its predecessors, to encourage the
settlement of sales disputes. This function can best be promoted
by option b.
Purposive interpretation resolves problems of semantic ambigu-
ity by selecting the meaning that will best effectuate the isolated
purpose. This selection is useful because a statement of purpose
tends to be formulated with reference to concrete needs, such as
the seller's need to know that the buyer considers him to have
breached the contract notwithstanding his acceptance of the goods.
Thus, the formulated purpose tends to be more directly tied to the
type of experience commonly encountered by lawyers. Purposive
interpretation reduces the level of abstraction typically character-
istic of the language of the Code standing alone.
2. Syntactic Ambiguity
When ambiguity exists not in the meaning of individual words
or sets of words, but in how they are logically arranged in terms
of their antecedents and consequences, the purposive interpreter is
faced with a slightly different problem-that of syntactic ambigu-
ity. 157 Section 2-316(3), the warranty disclaimer provision, presents
an example illustrating this problem. s58 The provision starts with
the words, "Notwithstanding subsection (2)," suggesting that what
follows is a complete exception to the preceding subsection. Never-
15 See text accompanying notes 46-61 supra.
5 6 See text accompanying notes 100-06 supra.
157 See Allen & Caldwell, supra note 154, at 228.
15 8 See text accompanying notes 73-84 supra.
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theless, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Fairchild Industries v.
Maritime Air Service Ltd.159 found that only a partial exception
was intended. Subsection (2) requires two ingredients for effective
disclaimer of the merchantability warranty: use of the word mer-
chantability, and, in the case of a writing, conspicuous placement
of the disclaimer. The Fairchild court concluded, in light of the
recognized purpose of preventing surprise, that "Notwithstanding"
was addressed to the first, but not the second ingredient.160 A close
reading of the Comments revealed that the drafters did not design
section 2-316(3)(a) as an independent category at all, but rather as
an example of the way in which warranties could be disclaimed by
trade usage under section 2-316(3)(c).161 The language of the Code
itself does not reveal this design; it is hidden, just as the partial
exception found by the Fairchild court was not apparent from an
examination of the statutory text.
Either interpretation of section 2-316 may be correct; in any
event it stands as an example of poor draftsmanship in which the
intended logical connections were unnecessarily obscured. Yet
ordinary prose cannot always be easily molded into a reasonably
compact statement that evidences precisely the conditions and con-
sequences of its application.
Consider the drafting of U.C.C. section 3-201. That section
was intended to integrate several provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Law.162 Section 49 of the N.I.L. provided that transfer
of an order instrument without indorsement "vests in the transferee
such title as the transferor had therein." This provision was de-
signed to overcome the common law notion that an assignee of a
chose in action took only an equitable interest and not a legal title.
Section 49 thus enabled a transferee without indorsement to sue
on the instrument in his own name.163 The section was not de-
signed to change the requirements of becoming a holder; it specified
that negotiation did not occur until an indorsement was placed on
the instrument. A second N.I.L. provision, section 58, contained a
stipulation that "a holder who derives his title through a holder in
due course . . . has all the rights of such former holder in respect
of all parties prior to the latter." This language was designed to
protect the market of a holder in due course (HDC) by sheltering
the rights of a holder buying from him. Note that only a holder
159 274 Md. 181, 333 A.2d 313 (1975).
160 See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra.
161 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 7; see note 82 supra.
162 UN om NEGOnABLE INSTRUmENTs LAW §§ 27, 49, 58.
163 See W. BnrrroN, BILLS AND NoTms § 74 (2d ed. 1961).
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was to be sheltered; a transferee without indorsement of order paper
could not take advantage of the stipulation in section 58.
The drafters of the Code determined to carry forward these
rules, but thought they could simplify them. They generalized
section 49, talking in terms of "rights" rather than "title." Their
fundamental proposition, stated in section 3-201(1), was that "[t]rans-
fer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as the trans-
feror has therein . . ." The generalized language made it
unnecessary to state separately ,the shelter formula of section 58
because a purchaser from an HDC would be sheltered under this
fundamental proposition. The wording of section 3-201(1) standing
alone, however, suggests a short-cut way of acquiring holder status
not available under the pre-Code law. A transferee without indorse-
ment of order paper might thereby succeed to the rights of his
holder-transferor.
That this result was not intended is evidenced by section
3-201(3), carrying forward the rule of section 49 of the N.I.L. that
"[n]egotiation takes effect only when the indorsement is made .... "
This reflects the policy denying the special advantages of HDC status
to a person taking the instrument under irregular circumstances in
which it lacks the indorsement necessary for negotiation.'64 It would
serve no practical purpose to include section 3-201(3) barring a
transferee without indorsement from being a holder in his own right
if a transferee without indorsement could be a holder based on the
rights of his transferor under section 3-201(1).
Unfortunately, these rather complex relationships are not evi-
dent on the face of section 3-201, and the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, in an early decision construing the provision, held that a
transferee without indorsement could qualify as a holder based on
the status of his transferor. 6 5 Later, more purposive readings were
not misled by the ailure of the draftsmen to articulate that section
3-201(3) stands as a practical limitation on the sweeping language
of section 3-201(1) in this complex situation. 66
164 See U.C.C. § 3-201, Comment 7. A similar policy in regard to fictitious
payees and impostors is expressed in U.C.C. § 3-405. Compare UNwOnm NEco-
TL.BLE INsrumENTs LAw § 9(3).
165 Bowling Green, Inc. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 425 F.2d 81 (1st Cir.
1970). Commentators have criticized the decision. See Hawkland, Depository
Banks as Holders in Due Course, 76 CoM. LJ. 124 (1971); Comment, Bowling
Green: The Bank as a Holder in Due Course, 71 CoLum. L. BEV. 302 (1971);
12 B.C. INnus. & CoM. L. REv. 282 (1970).
166 United Overseas Bank v. Veneers, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 596 (D. Md. 1974);
Security Pac. Nat'1 Bank v. Chess, 58 Cal. App. 3d 555, 129 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1976);
see also Cheshire Commercial Corp. v. Messier, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 542, 278 A.2d 413
(1971).
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Even apart from complex subject matter, syntactic ambiguity is
difficult to avoid because ordinary English language connectives
may be ambiguous in their logical implications. Words such as "if"
in the statement, "If X, then Y," may involve only simple implica-
tion, in which case the absence of X does not preclude the realiza-
tion of Y in another fashion. On the other hand, "if" may express
the more complex idea of co-implication, that is, "If and only if X,
then Y." If co-implication is intended, then Y cannot be achieved
without X.167 The problem posed by this logical distinction will be
present whether a legislative rule is expressly stated as a hypothetical
proposition in the form, "If X, then Y," or if it is reducible to that
form without changing its meaning. Every provision of the Code
leaves the interpreter with the question: "Can a negative inference
be drawn from what the drafters said here?"
The language of the statute may be misleading as to whether
the logical grammar of co-implication was intended. For example,
one of the alternative privity of contract provisions of the Code
reads:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of
his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable
to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected
by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty ... .168
This language taken alone leads to the conclusion that a person
may gain the benefit of a seller's warranty only if he falls within the
designated class of beneficiaries. That such a negative implication
was not intended is learned from Comment 3 to section 2-318 which
declares:
[This] alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries
within its provisions the family, household and guests, of
the purchaser. Beyond this, the section in this form is
neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the de-
veloping case law on whether the seller's warranties, given
to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the dis-
tributive chain.
167 See Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor-Edged Tool for Drafting and Inter-
preting Legal Documents, 66 YA.xr LE . 833, 833-37, 840-42 (1957); Comment,
supra note 148, at 974-77.
168 U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative A.
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The drafters of the Code did not intend to preclude courts from
extending warranty protection to an employee of the buyer, 69 or
from recognizing a buyer's right to sue a remote manufacturer,
70
but their art was apparently not sufficient to codify an intention of
simple implication in the text of this alternative.
Whatever the level of the draftsman's art, purposive interpreta-
tion can compensate for his limitations. It attacks the problem of
syntactic ambiguity by looking at the message as a whole. Following
the analysis of linguistic philosophy, it translates the "meaning unit"
in its entirety, whether it is'a sentence or a set of provisions. A
purposive interpreter will say: "Whatever section 2-316 requires it
must be something that will prevent the buyer from being surprised
by a disclaimer provision. If we can tell in the light of this mani-
fested purpose that the draftsman did not express himself clearly,
we are entitled to ignore his deficient syntax." We may reject the
negative implication of the section by referring to the less abstract
manifestation of the statement of purpose.' 7 ' When we speak of
preventing the buyer from being surprised by a hidden disclaimer
clause, we speak of concrete experiences.
A similar tendency is manifested when courts conclude that a
construction surety need not comply with article 9 of the Code in
order to have priority over the financier of a defaulted contractor
with respect to contract retainages. The abstract text of the relevant
Code provision reads: "[T]his Article applies . . . to any transaction
(regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest
in personal property . ... " 172 A surety typically takes a written
assignment of the contractor's contract rights in the project, and,
hence, appears to be engaged in a security transaction. But courts
have defined the purpose of article 9 as the regulation of financing,
and have consistently held that a surety is not a financier. They
uphold a surety's priority, however, not on the basis of his written
assignment, but rather under the doctrine of equitable subroga-
tion.173 Thus, the Code language, in spite of its apparent inclusive-
ness, has not been held to give rise to a negative inference that the
equivalent of a security interest can only be established by com-
pliance with article 9. This conclusion is not readily apparent upon
the face of statutory language using so abstract a concept as "any
169 See Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974).
170 See Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
171 See text accompanying notes 147-52 supra.
172 U.C.C. § 9-102 (1).
1 t3 E.g., National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843
(1st Cir. 1969).
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transaction . . . intended to create a security interest;" but refer-
ence to the activity of financing, made relevant by purposive inter-
pretation, does support such a conclusion.
Of course, use of the purpose formula does not resolve all pos-
sibilities of ambiguity. For example, there is a question whether
"financing" is involved when a cattle farmer sells his livestock to a
meatpacker and receives the meatpacker's check for the purchase
price. After some hesitancy, the Fifth Circuit has concluded that
the cattle farmer is subject to article 9 rules even though he con-
siders himself a "cash seller" rather than a financier.174 Purposive
interpretation reduces the number of problems caused by ambiguity;
it does not eliminate them.
3. Vagueness
Purposive interpretation is also responsive to the problem of
vagueness, but it reduces this characteristic of language in a different
fashion. Vagueness is inherent in section 3-406 of the Code, which
precludes a person from asserting forgery or alteration of an instru-
ment if "by his negligence" he has "substantially contribute[d]" to
that forgery or alteration. The adverb "substantially" is an indica-
tion of intentional vagueness.175 In contrast with the phrase "in
any way contributing" it can be expected to create a broader range
of cases in which its applicability is doubtful. Apparently the
drafters intended to impose the loss on the negligent person only
when he was commercially responsible in light of the particular
facts. 176 Asking whether the drawer was negligent in a given in-
stance, so that it could be said that he was commercially responsible,
is less abstract an inquiry than a search for a substantial contribu-
tion. At this level of application, therefore, a purposive reading
may assist the interpreter in resolving problems of vagueness. The
174 In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane). See
McDonnell, The Floating Lienor as Good Faith Purchaser, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 429
(1977).
175 See M. BLAcK, supra note 145, at 42 n.34.
1 7 6 See U.C.C. § 3-406, Comment 3 ("No attempt is made to define negligence
which will contribute to an alteration. The question is left to the court or the jury
upon the circumstances of the particular cases."). Courts faced with the construc-
tion of § 3-406 have tended to utilize the distinction in pre-Code case law between
negligence that is a "direct and proximate cause" of the forgery or alteration, and
mere "laxity in business practices" which would not preclude a drawer from assert-
ing the forgery or alteration against a payor. In so doing they have participated
in the second method of avoiding purposive interpretation, described at text accom-
panying notes 85-119 supra. See, e.g., Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 491 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1974); Cast v. American Cas. Co., 99 N.J.
Super. 538, 240 A.2d 682 (1968); Gresham State Bank v. 0 & K Constr. Co., 231
Ore. 106, 370 P.2d 726 (1962).
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most significant contribution that purposive interpretation makes
to this kind of issue, however, is preserving the vagueness of the
doctrinal formulation.
Even in cases in which the statutory provision is not calculated
to achieve open-ended inquiry, however, purposive interpretation
will not resolve all vagueness problems. For example, having de-
termined that the Code's warranty disclaimer provisions are de-
signed to protect buyers from hidden disclaimers, 177 the purposive
interpreter may still be unable to tell in a given case whether the
language used is "hidden" or "conspicuous." Purposive interpreta-
tion helps the courts deal with problems of vagueness only in a
certain, but significant, range of cases.
4. Lexical Clarity
As the preceding sections illustrate, Twining's suggestion that
statutory text and purpose formulations stand on the same linguistic
footing 178 must be rejected. Because statements of purpose tend to
be less abstract, they assist the interpreter with problems of ambi-
guity and vagueness that adhere in the Code text. This line of
reasoning raises the question explored by Professor Hart 179 whether
linguistic indeterminacy is a precondition to purposive inquiry.
The application of the text of the Code to a specified fact
situation is not always vague or ambiguous, and to this extent lexical
clarity is possible. For example, under section 9-302 of the Code a
financier must file a financing statement to perfect a non-possessory
security interest in his debtor's inventory. If a financier simply
posts a sign over the debtor's stock of goods, he has clearly failed to
file a financing statement. The directive that a financing statement
must be filed is sufficiently concrete to inform a financier that it
cannot be satisfied by the act of posting a sign; there is no problem
of ambiguity or vagueness. Suppose, however, that instead of post-
ing a sign, a financier presents the required statement to the specified
official only to have that official fail to index it properly. The
directive of section 9-302 is no longer lexically clear with respect
to this situation. For this reason the drafters had to explain even
the concrete directive of section 9-302 by stating in section 9-403(1):
"Presentation for filing of a financing statement and tender of the
filing fee or acceptance of the statement by the filing officer con-
stitutes filing under this Article."
177 See text accompanying notes 73-84 supra.
178 See text accompanying note 141 supra.
179 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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Even this added definition does not create complete lexical
clarity because "constitutes" is syntactically ambiguous. It could
mean either "are required for" or "are the only acts required for."
Purposive readings of section 9-403 have established that the latter
translation was intended. °80 The language of sections 9-302 and
9-403 considered in light of these hypothetical problems is relatively
concrete; but the application of less concrete statutory language to
the same factual situations will probably be less dear. Counsel for
the inventory financier who only posted a sign may argue, for
instance, that the financier had gained "possession" of the property,
and thus perfected his interest as a pledge under section 9-305.
Gaining "possession" is not like "filing a financing statement," as
any veteran of a first year property course is aware. Moreover "pos-
session" cannot be translated as "control" because for some purposes
under the language of law posting a sign is a means of asserting
control over property."I'
It is remarkable how easily lexical clarity may be eliminated
by changes in either the legal standard or the factual situation.
For example, General Motors, as a car manufacturer, would un-
doubtedly be regarded as a merchant for purposes of section 2-201(2)
of the U.C.C. The application is much less clear if in the context
of a given controversy General Motors is not engaged in the manu-
facture of cars but the raising of apples.
8 2
Lexically clear applications of law are of considerable impor-
tance to the attorney who must guide his clients even when the limita-
tions of language do not come into play, but they seldom solve the
jurist's quandry. An advocate would litigate an identifiably plain
application of law to fact only if he were ignorant of the legal rule,
failed to share basic language conventions with his community,
found himself in a desperate situation, or believed the statutory lan-
guage, though lexically clear, not to reflect the legislative will.
Identifiable lexical clarity is rare with respect to the pivotal issues
of an appellate case because Hart's standard case stays in the law
office. Even if a jurist believed he was confronted with such a case,
verification of its presence would be difficult. Both ambiguity and
vagueness are dependent upon the relationship of patterns of lan-
180 See In re Royal Electrotype Corp., 485 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1973); In re
Fowler, 407 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. Okla. 1975); In re May Lee Indus., Inc., 380
F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1407 (2d Cir. 1974).
181 "Posting" laws, for example, operate to restrict access to land for such
divergent purposes as hunting and parking. In the commercial law field some states
allow posting to be used to give notice of consignments. See U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (a).
1
8 2 See text accompanying notes 28-61 supra.
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guage to the given fact situation. The conventions of language
usage are not precisely defined; nor is linguistics a subject about
which the typical jurist can claim special expertise. These con-
siderations suggest that the judge, simply as a matter of prudence,
should never decide a case on the assumption that he can apply the
statutory text with regard to linguistic convention alone.
5. Legislative Misstatement
Apart from the practical questions raised in the preceding
section, even if lexical clarity exists, its presence is not sufficient to
decide a controversy under the principles of purposive interpreta-
tion. A direct consequence of the methodology of purposive inter-
pretation is that non-purposive statutory language or implications
of language, even if lexically clear, may be disregarded by the inter-
preter. The possibility that the term "merchant" may mean only
one who buys and sells as a livelihood can be disregarded once the
Code drafter's policy of tying merchant status to expertise is per-
ceived. The misleading connective "Notwithstanding section (2)"
which introduces section 2-316(3) loses much of its force once the
underlying principle of protecting the buyer from surprise is articu-
lated. If it could be shown that the legislature had misspoken-had
simply not said what it meant, even though it spoke clearly-would
purposive interpretation treat this type of language deficiency any
differently than ambiguity or vagueness?
Obviously, a case of this type will be rare because drafters do
not typically use clear language without meaning what it expresses.
Nevertheless, consider in this regard Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mer-
cantile National Bank,18 3 in which an Atlanta bank (Mercantile
National) confirmed a letter of credit issued by a non-banking cor-
poration. The issue was whether such a confirmation was possible
under article 5 of the Code in view of its definition of "confirming
bank" in section 5-103, which reads: "A 'confirming bank' is a bank
which engages either that it will itself honor a credit already issued
by another bank or that such a credit will be honored by the issuer
or a third bank." 184 This definition, drawn to reflect the normal
practice of banks in dealing with credits, appears to limit "confirm-
ing bank" to a bank confirming the credits of another bank, and
the credit in Barclays Bank was not of that description. Accordingly,
Mercantile National argued that it could not be liable under section
5-107(2) which states: "A confirming bank by confirming a credit
183 481 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
184 U.C.C. §5-103(1)(f) (emphasis supplied).
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becomes directly obligated on the credit to the extent of its con-
firmation . .. .
There was no problem of semantic ambiguity or vagueness in
this case, although it could have been treated as a problem of syn-
tactic ambiguity. Sections 5-102(l)(f) and 5-107(2) could be read as
making the simple implication: If a bank confirms the credit of
another bank, then the confirming bank is itself liable on the letter
of credit. Absent co-implication, the provisions could not be read
as supporting the negative inference that only the credits of another
bank may be confirmed. Thus, a court would be free apart from
these provisions, to rule on its own that the confirmation of non-
bank credits results in liability to the confirming bank.
The Fifth Circuit in Barclays Bank, however, did not wish to
describe the liability of the bank as arising apart from the rules of
article 5. Mercantile National also denied its liability on the
grounds that its commitment was a guaranty not within the power
of a national bank to make. 85 A guaranty has been distinguished
from a letter of credit in that the former does not involve direct
liability. To avoid Mercantile National's guaranty argument the
court chose to associate the bank's action as closely as possible with
the usual, direct liability of a confirming bank under section
5-107(2). Hence it concluded that Mercantile's liability arose under
that section of the Code in spite of its definition of a confirming
bank. The court stated:
Mercantile fails to look beyond the words embodied in the
definition of a confirming bank. It fails to ask the crucial
question-what policy justification is there for holding that
a bank cannot confirm the credit of a non-bank issuer and
thereby incur the obligations which the Code imposes on a
confirming bank? Mercantile would have us apply a rule
without examining the reason for that rule. But in order
to justify applying a particular rule of law to a given set of
circumstances, the application of that rule must advance
the policy which gave birth to the rule in the first instance.
This concept, whether followed implicitly or explicitly, is
fundamental to our system of jurisprudence, as well as, to a
proper application of the Uniform Commercial Code.
We have endeavored to determine if indeed there is a
good reason for us to hold that a bank cannot confirm the
credit of a non-bank issuer. This inquiry was necessary
because we recognize that the drafters of the U.C.C. did not
choose their words lightly, and a court should not be quick
185 481 F.2d at 1235; see 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1977).
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to conclude that an apparent rule of the Code is either un-
wise or inapplicable. Our search for a sound policy reason
to apply the definition of a confirming bank literally and
to exclude from Code-governance anyone who does not fit
neatly within it has been in vain however. There is no
reason to conclude that a bank should be unable to confirm
the credit of a non-bank issuer under the U.C.C
s86
The court then found that underlying policies of both the Code
and article 5 supported confirmation of non-bank credits. It pointed
to the central objective of encouraging new commercial practices
articulated in section 1-102(2)(b) 187 and the declaration in section
5-102(3) that article 5 is not intended as an exhaustive treatment of
the concept of letters of credit.' 8 In short, it found that in light of
its only operative purpose the definition of a confirming bank was
over-specified, and that the over-specification could be disregarded.
It denied operative force to the Code language just as if it were a
simple, but clear, slip of the legislative pen.
The Barclay Bank opinion demonstrates how a court dedicated
to purposive interpretation would approach legislative misstatement.
The opinion held that the words of a statute are not sacred in them-
selves, but are entitled to respect only to the extent they embody a
legislative purpose. This approach would improve the whole process
of statutory interpretation by preventing a judge from dodging pur-
posive inquiry on the grounds that his case is lexically clear. He
would still be required to confirm that the "clear" language is pur-
posive. The approach would also make it more difficult for a judge
to attribute a result to the legislature when that body has not
adopted a policy compelling that result. 8 9
An objection may be raised at this point that purposive inter-
pretation knows no limits. If the "art of proliferating a purpose" 190
is not controlled by clear legislative text, what are its limits? How
far can the courts go in disregarding literal language that the legis-
186 481 F.2d at 1230.
18l Id.
188 Id. 1231. Section 5-102(3) also states: "The fact that this Article states a
rule does not by itself require, imply or negate application of the same or a converse
rule to a situation not provided for or to a person not specified by this Article."
189 For example, courts in Georgia and Maryland have refused to extend article
2 warranty provisions to certain bailments and leases because the text of the article
deals with "sales." See Mays v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 132 Ga. App. 602, 203
S.E.2d 614 (1974); Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972). Comment
2 to § 2-313, however, expressly states that no such policy restriction was intended.
190 The term was created by Judge Learned Hand in Brooklyn Nat'l Corp. v.
Commissioner, 157 F.2d 450, 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 733 (1946).
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lature, as the chief policy making body within a democratic system,
has declared to be the law?
IV. THE LIMITS OF PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION
Advocates of purposive interpretation who insist that linguistic
convention is itself insufficient to limit an articulated purpose have
experienced difficulty in defining what those limits are. The prob-
lem troubled Professor Fuller who, in making it concrete, supposed
a criminal statute declaring: "The sale of absinthe shall be unlaw-
ful." The purpose of this enactment was stipulated to be the pro-
tection of public health. What is there, Fuller asked, to prevent a
judge from saying: "Now, as everyone knows, absinthe is a sound,
wholesome, and beneficial beverage. Therefore, interpreting the
statute in the light of its purpose, I construe it to direct a general
sale and consumption of that most healthful of beverages, ab-
sinthe." 191 As a purposive interpreter, a judge cannot rest with the
common meaning of the terms of the prohibition. Fuller, admitting
that his explanation lacked clarity, attempted to resolve the difficulty
by saying that every statute has a "structure" that is either explicit
in the enactment itself or exists by virtue of its relationship to other
laws; therefore a construction of the absinthe prohibition statute
that nonetheless permitted the sale of absinthe would violate its
structural integrity.192 Under Fuller's analysis "structure," a sepa-
rate entity, rather than linguistic convention, limits the extent to
which purpose may be promoted by the court.
The restraining force in this type of case need not be viewed as
distinct from legislative purpose. The methodology of purposive
interpretation outlined in this Article would take the interpreter
beyond the generalized formulation of the act that recognized its
intention to protect the public health. Concentrating first on the
language of the enactment, the purposive interpreter would note its
specificity. The legislature did not prohibit the sale of dangerous
drugs; it prohibited the sale of absinthe. This specificity suggests
that the legislature made the factual determination that absinthe is
harmful and that it has, in effect, adopted a sub-policy of precluding
any contest in the courts about the healthiness of absinthe. A re-
view of the legislative history of the absinthe prohibition statute
would, in all probability, confirm the adoption of this specific sub-
policy. Certainly such a purpose would be articulated in any com-
mentary accompanying the enactment.
191 Fuller, supra note 10, at 670.
192 Id.
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A similar analysis can be made of Code provisions. For example,
section 9-301(l)(b) states that "an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the rights of . . a person who becomes a lien
creditor before the security interest is perfected." The purpose of
the perfection requirement is to protect third parties who might
otherwise rely on apparently unencumbered assets in the hands of
the debtor. Perfection, whether by public filing or by the secured
party taking possession, 193 gives public notice of the security interest.
Nevertheless, the legislative text is specific; it protects any "lien
creditor," not just "creditors who rely on apparently unencumbered
assets." A financier who fails to perfect cannot argue that he should
prevail against a particular lien creditor because that lien creditor
in dealing with the debtor did not rely on apparently clear assets.
Even a lien creditor who knew of the unperfected security interest
when he extended credit is entitled to protection. The provision
implements a sub-policy of precluding contests about whether a par-
ticular lien creditor so relied, in order to avoid evidentiary diffi-
culties with respect to that issue."
There is a danger that the general objective will be pictured as
an ultimate end that exerts no decisional restraints beyond those
embodied in the means or subpolicy, while the means, equated with
the statutory text, will be viewed as a rigid prescription that must
always be followed. The theory of purposive interpretation rejects
both of these propositions. Legislative purpose, whether expressed
generally or specifically, is entitled to be implemented (or "pro-
moted," to use the Code's word 195) unless it conflicts with another
purpose adopted by the legislature, or otherwise recognized by law,
that is entitled to priority.
Although the policy of protecting parties from secret security
interests might be extended so as to subordinate unperfected security
interests to claimants who are not lien creditors, the proviso of
section 9-201 that "a security agreement is effective according to its
terms," "except as otherwise provided by this Act" 19 cuts against
such an extension. The policy of effectuating security arrangements
'93 See U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-305.
194 See Comment, Security Interests Under Pledge Agreements, 51 YALE L.J.
431, 446-47 (1942).
195 See U.C.C. § 1-102(1); text accompanying note 21 supra.
196For an example of purposive interpretation which, in the absence of a
countervailing policy, carries a Code policy beyond the statutory text, see Riley v.
Miller, 549 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Ky. 1977) (financing statement without addresses
effective under § 9-402 where all concerned know location of debtor and secured
party).
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agreed to by a debtor and financier limits the policy of protecting
against secret liens. Only those categories of claims listed in section
9-301 are entitled to priority over unperfected interests. Further-
more, as another component which purposive interpretation must
consider, those categories are themselves subject to qualification as a
result of external policies that underlie the Code. If, for example,
a lien creditor, before extending financing to the common debtor,
not only learned of an existing unperfected security interest but
also told the secured financier not to worry about filing a financing
statement, a concept such as "estoppel" would be used to deny the
lien creditor priority. The seemingly absolute subordination of un-
perfected security interests to lien claims might no longer obtain.
This process of limiting a statutory purpose by reference to
other objectives recognized by the legal system is illustrated by
the decision in General Insurance Co. v. Lowry,197 which involved
another article 9 priority rule. Under section 9-312(5) of the 1962
Code, security interests that were not all perfected by filing were
ranked in chronological order of perfection, assuming that more
specific priority rules stated in the Code were not applicable. The
general rule was to grant priority to the holder of the first interest
perfected even if he took his interest with knowledge of an existing
unperfected claim in order to reward the diligent 1 98 In the Lowry
case Lowry had executed notes granting a security interest in stock
to General Insurance. Lowry also signed a memorandum promising
that he would "do no act which will reduce or impair the security
. . ." and would "cooperate in the preparation and execution of
the instruments necessary to perfect the security." 199 Lowry's
counsel in this transaction witnessed his client's signature on the
memorandum promising cooperation in regard to the collateral.
Although the security interest in the stock could only be perfected
by delivery of the stock certificates to the insurance company, no
such transfer occurred. Instead the shares were pledged to secure
Lowry's debt to his attorney's law firm. By taking possession of the
stock certificates the attorney perfected a security interest in the
stock on behalf of his firm, and under section 9-312(5)(b) the law
firm was entitled to priority over General Insurance, whose interest
was unperfected. The court felt, however, that there were "unusual
circumstances" which in the name of "good faith" precluded this
197412 F. Supp. 12 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
198 U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (b) (1962 version).
199 412 F. Supp. at 13.
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result.200 In spite of the rule in section 9-312(5), it recognized an
"equitable lien" granting priority to the insurance company. Al-
though the court referred to the concept of good faith, it did not
even cite the U.C.C. provision declaring that "[e]very contract or
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement." 201 The court supported its holding
by reference to the need to invoke its equitable powers "in nar-
rowly-circumscribed situations," 202 a procedure it found to be con-
sistent with the Code.
Cases like Lowry demonstrate the value of analyzing all legis-
lative material in terms of purpose or policy. A legislative text,
even a specific one, is never a complete statement, and is not in-
tended to be. The legislature could not anticipate the facts of the
Lowry case, but it could anticipate the possibility of fact situations
arising in which according priority to the first perfected interest
would be unfair or cause unnecessary hardship. A court might
then find equitable relief consistent with section 9-312, recognizing
that that section expressed a policy not intended to be absolute.
Similar flexibility would exist in the case of a statute prohibiting
the use of absinthe. If a defendant could show that consumption
of absinthe was necessary to prevent him from going blind, the
court would free him on a defense of necessity, even though the
text of the legislation was silent concerning such a justification.20 3
Once the incompleteness of statutory formulas is appreciated, it can
be understood why the courts grant relief in cases presenting par-
ticular equities or hardships.204
The crucial step in statutory interpretation under the Code
and elsewhere frequently consists of determining which of two or
more expressed policies are entitled to priority in a given factual
context. The methodology of purposive interpretation is again help-
ful in determining that priority. The search for the intended
priority begins with the language of the Code. In considering the
status of farmers under section 2-201(2), two policies were discovered
to be at work: minimizing one-sidedness in the operation of the
200 Id. 14.
201 U.C.C. § 1-203.
202 412 F. Supp. at 14.
203 See United States v. Randall, 20 Cmr. L. REP. (BNA) 2299 (D.C. Super.
Ct. 1976) (use of marijuana to treat glaucoma); Gardner, The Defense of Necessity
and the Right to Escape From Prison-A Step Towards Incarceration Free From
Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 110 (1975).
2 0 4 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889), which figures so
prominently in Professor Dworkin's development of the role of principles, can be
explained on this basis. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
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Statute of Frauds by allowing a memo binding the sender to bind
the receiver; and protecting those not knowledgeable about the
merchant practice of answering inaccurate memos.20 5 The opening
words of the section stating a rule that is to apply "Between mer-
chants" suggests that the second policy has priority here, and that
suggestion is confirmed in the commentary to section 2-104.2o06
Similarly, the policy of effectuating security arrangements ex-
pressed in section 9-201 was found to prevent the extension of the
policy disapproving secret security arrangements by benefitting those
not expressly protected in section 9-301. 207 The language of section
9-201 declaring security agreements to be effective according to their
terms "except as otherwise provided by this Act" stands as an ex-
press statement of priority.
Likewise, the Lowry court, in subordinating the law firm that
was first to perfect its security interest, might have pointed to the
language of section 1-203 that "Every contract or duty within this
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or en-
forcement." 208 Here the word "every" expresses the priority which
the Code drafters accorded to the objective of protecting parties
from those acting in bad faith.
In this last case, of course, the issue of priority is not difficult,
and its resolution is not dependent on a manifestation of priority in
the statutory language or the Comments. The conflicting policies
before the Lowry court were rewarding the diligent and protecting
the unsuspecting from misleading conduct. Once the court deter-
mined that the lawyer's conduct in Lowry amounted to bad faith,
there was no doubt that the second policy would prevail. The deep
institutional bias within those divisions of our legal system dealing
with commercial matters against fraud or conduct approaching
fraud would create a consensus on the predominant policy in Lowry
even if the Code had not contained a good faith provision. Such
institutional values may be regarded as the commercial law equiv-
alent of the background factors, or "policies," which Dworkin sug-
gested must be considered in projecting legislative purpose2 09
There are occasions, however, when neither the technique of
purposive interpretation nor recognized institutional priorities will
provide an easy answer for selecting among several relevant statu-
205 See text accompanying notes 46-61 supra.
206 U.C.C. §§ 2-201(2), 2-104, Comment 2.
207 See text accompanying note 196 supra.
208 See text accompanying notes 197-202 supra.
209 See note 2 supra.
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tory objectives. Consider the issue, presented in the American
Card 210 case, whether a standard form financing statement may
operate as a security agreement when there is only parol evidence
that the parties intended it to have that effect. As noted in the
earlier discussion, 211 two policies are embodied in sections 9-203 and
9-105(l)(1) of the Code. The first is a desire to simplify the formal
requisites for a security agreement in the interest of effectuating
agreements actually made by the parties. The second is the evi-
dentiary policy embodied in the requirement of a written agreement
which "creates or provides for" a security interest. The courts have
uniformly held that a financing statement standing alone is insuffi-
cient,212 but their decisions seem to be grounded on non-purposive
readings of the language in section 9-105(l), "creates or provides for."
The image extracted from this language is that it requires at least a
diluted form of granting clause.213 Typically that image hinges on
a dictionary translation of "provides for." 214 The Code language
is sufficiently ambiguous, however, to include the possibility that a
financing statement provides for a security interest if the parties so
intend. The Comments to section 9-203 are also inconclusive on
the dividing line between these policies.216 Indeed, the desired
aim of the draftsmen of these sections is notably unclear.216
When the priority policy in relation to a contested situation is
not disclosed by the Code's language, history, or commentary, the
purposive interpreter faces a difficulty similar to that which he con-
fronts when absolutely no policy is disclosed by those sources. He
may seek guidance from the general underlying objectives stated
in section 1-102,21.7 but those objectives are stated with a generality
that diminishes their usefulness. They may, in fact, also point in
2 1 0 American Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963).
2 1 1 See text accompanying notes 85-97 supra.
212 See Mitchell v. Shepherd Mall State Bank, 458 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1972);
Mid-Eastern Elecs., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 380 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1967); Needle
v. Lasco Indus., Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 1105, 89 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1970).
213 See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
214 Id.
2151n support of the simplification policy, see Comments 5 ("this Article
reduces formal requisites to a minimum") and 4 (parol evidence may be used to
show absolute conveyance intended for security). On the other hand, Comment 3
indicates that the requirement of a written record "minimizes the possibility of
future dispute as to the terms of a security agreement ...," and another sentence
within Comment 5 characterizes the provision as "in the nature of a Statute of
Frauds."
216 Professor Gilmore has confessed, for example, that he sees no justification
for different sets of requisites for a security agreement (U.C.C. § 9-203) and a
financing statement (U.C.C. § 9-402). 1 G. GmionE, supra note 109, at § 11.4.
217 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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different directions. A court faced with the problem of the financ-
ing statement as security agreement today would have to contend
with the policy of simplification in section 1-102(2)(a), which sup-
ports the recognition of a financing statement as a security agree-
ment, and the policy of uniformity in section 1-102(2)(c), which, in
light of the case law, supports the contrary result. Moreover, how
is the jurist to assess which alternative will modernize the law
governing commercial transactions in accordance with section 1-102
(2)(a)? Will not his assessment of the consequences of each con-
struction become more significant as the inquiry into legislative
purpose becomes more speculative?
Nor is this the kind of case in which background institutional
priorities of the type noted in Lowry provide a persuasive reason
for holding that the simplification or evidentiary policy should con-
trol. The competing institutional values here are the desire to
effectuate the intended agreement of the parties, on the one hand,
and the need for certainty in regard to important commercial
transactions, on the other. Our system does not accord an obvious
priority to either of these values, just as their priority with respect
to this case is evidenced by neither the Code, its commentary, nor
its history. From the standpoint of the purposive interpreter, he
faces a "Hard Code Case"-not because of the presence of linguistic
indeterminacy, but because of his inability to resolve the indeter-
minacy by using the methodology of purposive interpretation.
21 8
Consistency with the realism of his forebears requires the pur-
posive interpreter to admit at this point that his methodology is in-
adequate to restrain his judgment. The courts have not acknowl-
edged this inherent difficulty present within the financing statement
as security agreement issue,2 19 but have reflexively preferred the
value of evidentiary certainty to simplification,220 and held the
218 Professor Soper gives a similar definition of a hard case. See Soper, supra
note 12, at 486-88. He also advocates the recognition of "judicial technique prin-
ciples" which are not to be considered "law" but rather are implicit in the concept
of judging. Id. 490-92. If Soper's "judicial technique principles" were extended
to embrace the attitudes required for judging in a democratic society which recog-
nizes legislative supremacy, then the methodology of purposive interpretation would
qualify for inclusion in this category.
219 E.g., In re Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32 (W.D. Va. 1970); Crete State Bank v.
Lauhoff Grain Co., 195 Neb. 605, 239 N.W.2d 789 (1976).
220 The non-purposive cases in this area frequently rely on Safe Deposit Bank
& Trust Co. v. Berman, 393 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1968), which held that a security
agreement limited to a specific note could not be amended by subsequent notes to
cover new advances. The court stated:
To the extent that the legal significance of documents may be varied
and enlarged by other documents evidencing an understanding of the
immediate parties to a transaction, we suspect that the law of commercial
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financing statement alone to be insufficient. In so doing, they have
not been implementing a legislative policy, but fashioning one of
their own.2
21
V. CONCLUSION: THE TECHNIQUE AND ITS IXM[PLICATIONS
Part of this Article has been devoted to showing how the
methodology of purposive interpretation has either been disregarded
or used in the construction of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Examples were given illustrating how courts use such devices as the
plain meaning rule, the pre-Code formula, and the summary state-
ment of authorities to effectuate their own policies in opposition to
those of the Code drafters. In contrast to these methods of sur-
reptitious judicial legislation, the method of purposive interpreta-
tion was outlined, involving the following steps:
I. Start with the statutory language and read it all as it
stands with an eye to the underlying purpose or purposes
and the relationship between them.
2. Look for articulation of purpose in the Official Com-
ments.
3. Explore how the present statutory text varies from
earlier drafts of the Code and from the treatment of the
same subject in pre-Code law.
transactions will not achieve the stated purposes. The basis of the trouble
here is that appellee used an inappropriate form to do what it apparently
wished. It not only chose to prop up its inadequate security agreement
With a narrative recitation on a note of the same date but persisted on at
least four other occasions in doing the same thing.
In a commercial world dependent upon the necessity to rely upon
documents meaning what they say, the explicit recitals on forms, without
requiring for their correct interpretation other documents not referred to,
would seem to be a dominant consideration. If security agreements which
on their face served as collateral for specific loans could be converted into
open-ended security arrangements for future liabilities by recitals in sub-
sequent notes, much needless uncertainty would be introduced into modem
commercial law. In effect, notes would take on the character of security
agreements.
Id. 404. It should be noted that the need for certainty treated by the court as the
"dominant consideration" is not listed as one of the Code's underlying purposes and
policies in § 1-102.
221 The limitations on purposive interpretation which are developed here are
those implicit in the rationale of the theory itself. Additional restraints on the
technique arise from other sources. For example, purposive interpretation would
not be controlling in a case in which the statute to be construed was unconstitu-
tional. In addition, it has been suggested that on the basis of institutional con-
siderations, courts are entitled to particularly unequivocal expressions of legislative
purpose with respect to politically sensitive questions. See Wellington & Albert,
Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v.
Atkinson, 72 YA=E L.J. 1547 (1963). Such questions are not often presented in
Code litigation.
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4. After considering statutory language, Official Com-
ments, and historic context, in seriatum, examine these
factors in combination for a coherent interpretation.
Purposive interpretation is not a license to be casual with the
language chosen by the legislature. It recognizes instead that legis-
lating is a complex and specialized act of speaking that cannot be
analogized to the simple command of parent to child. Democratic
values according priority to the legislature as the primary policy
making body are more likely to be effectuated if legislative pro-
nouncements are read in a way which takes into account the lin-
guistic problems faced by draftsmen. Experience with the technique
of purposive interpretation under the Code shows:
1. Legislative purpose can be articulated in a manner that
will control the decision in a significant range of cases. By re-
ducing linguistic problems of ambiguity and vagueness, the
technique of purposive interpretation can yield the one correct
result in those cases. Purposive interpretation can only reduce
linguistic indeterminacy, however; it cannot eliminate it. No
matter how skillful the articulation of purpose by the drafters,
cases will arise in which resolution is doubtful even in light of
the purpose of the relevant statutory provisions.
2. When legislative purpose has been articulated, it must
always be given due consideration. Hart's suggestion that some
standard cases may be decided in light of linguistic convention
alone must be rejected.222 Although lexical clarity is possible
with respect to a given fact situation, it is not sufficient itself to
dictate a decision. Purposive interpretation not only guides the
jurist through linguistic problems of ambiguity and vagueness,
but also ameliorates limitations on the draftsman's art. Refer-
ence to purpose guards against the comparatively rare hazard of
simple legislative misstatement. More importantly, it alerts the
judge to the incompleteness of the legislative text, .that is, its
typical failure to expressly exclude unusual cases in which ap-
plication of the particular policy would be unfair or cause
unnecessary hardship. Approaching the text from the baseline
of its purpose opens the way to barring its application in those
cases. This countervailing "escape-valve" policy of relieving
hardship can be allowed to control the legislative purpose ex-
pressed in a particular section of the Code.
222 See text accompanying notes 179-82 supra.
[Vol. 126-i795
PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION OF UCC
3. For similar reasons, Dworkin's model, in which legisla-
tive policy is limited by the canonical text of the statute, must
also be rejected by the purposive interpreter because it does not
allow for the correction of misstatement, for the promotion of
legislative policy in the absence of countervailing policies, or
for the balancing of conflicting policies. A court's decision is
restrained not by Code language itself but by the policies and
priorities it expresses. When the draftsmen have articulated
their goal and its priority with relation to other objectives, pur-
posive interpretation is available to preserve the interpretation
process as a contest about "what rights the legislature has al-
ready created." 223 Draftsmen are not perfect, however, and
they cannot always meet the needs of the purposive interpreter.
Moreover, even when those needs are met, the latent ambiguity
and vagueness of the formulation of purpose leads to other cases
that cannot be resolved under the purposive technique. A
"Hard Code Case" is one that cannot be resolved by purposive
interpretation. Such cases are contests not about what the legis-
lature has done but about the consequences, including general
social effects, of construing legislation in alternative ways.
At the level of the "Hard Code Case" the role of the judge as
lawmaker begins. Accordingly, experience under the Code gives
theoretical support to the positivist view that judicial legislation is
inevitable. At the same time, the range of cases that can be con-
trolled by purposive interpretation-including many cases thought
to present difficult and important U.C.C. problems-lends practical
encouragement to those who seek to minimize judicial legislation.
The "rights thesis" 224 may be, as Hart has termed it, a "Noble
Dream," 225 but it expresses an ideal worth seeking, and one which
we are capable of achieving, at least in part.
223 Dworkin, supra note 2, at 1088 n.23.
224 Id. 1058-60.
225 Hart, supra note 1.
